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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JENNIFER OTTENS, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
VS. 
NICKOLAS COLEMAN and DAN MCNEIL, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal is pursuant to URAP Rule 4a. At a trial, the Trial Court granted 
Defendants' Motion for Directed Verdict. Exhibit A. Final Judgment was entered on 
February 13,2009. Plaintiff filed her Notice of Appeal on March 11,2009. TR 986. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
AND CITATION PRESERVING ISSUE FOR APPEAL 
I. FIRST ISSUE ON APPEAL 
In spite of evidence of his failure to secure his personal property and in directing 
the loading thereof, did the Trial Court err in granting Defendant, Dan McNeil's 
(hereafter, Dan) Motion for a Directed Verdict and thereby dismissing Plaintiffs causes 
of action against Dan based upon a), direct liability and b). vicarious liability? 
Case No.050911123 
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A directed verdict is only sustained if after "examining all evidence in a light most 
favorable to the non-moving party, there is no competent evidence that would support a 
verdict in the non-moving party's favor." Merino v. Albertsons, Inc., 1999 UT 14, f 3, 
975 P.2d 467. Issue I was preserved for appeal at TR 984-986. 
II. SECOND ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion by denying Plaintiffs motion to join Dan's 
son, Jake, as a party when evidence indicated that Dan had potentially mislead law 
enforcement that he was the driver of the vehicle? '"The standard of review of a denial to 
amend pleadings is abuse of discretion'" Sulzen v. Williams, 977 P.2d 497 (Utah 1992). 
Issue II was preserved for review at TR 115-123,131-175. 
III. THIRD ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Did the Trial Court err when it allowed Dan to assert his Corporate Shield defense 
at trial and denied Plaintiffs Motion to add D & K as a party defendant? As a legal 
determination, the Standard of Review is for Correctness. When the court's analysis 
involves a legal determination, such determination will be reviewed "for correctness." 
Hansen, 852 P.2d 977,978,979 (Utah 1993). Issue III was preserved for review at 881 
(Counsel argued plaintiffs motion to preclude this defense and in the alternative, under 
Rule 15(b) to amend the complaint to add D & K as a party), 928,929, TT 7-10, 17:14-
25. 
IV. FOURTH ISSUE ON APPEAL 
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Did the Trial Court err when it granted Dan's motion to exclude evidence that he 
had been issued a traffic citation for failure to secure his load and had pled guilty thereto 
and paid the fine thereon? The trial court is granted broad discretion to admit or exclude 
evidence, and its decision thereon will only be disturbed if there is an abuse of discretion. 
State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96, % 20,989 P.2d 52. Issue IV was preserved for review at 
558-567, 769-791, 882-883, 858. 
V. FIFTH ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Did the Court Err when it denied Plaintiffs fourth motion to exclude evidence 
regarding when Plaintiff had retained an attorney? The trial court is granted broad 
discretion to admit or exclude evidence, and its decision thereon will only be disturbed if 
there is an abuse of discretion. State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96, f 20,989 P.2d 52. Issue V 
was preserved for review at 884, 764A-765, 804-808, 820-831. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. AND RULES 
The second and third issues in this case is governed by URCP Rule 15(a) & (b) 
that states: 
Rule 15 (a ) . . . A party may amend his pleading . . . only by leave of court . . . ; 
and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires . . . 
(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence. When issues not raised by the 
pleading are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated 
in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendments of the 
pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to 
raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after 
judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the result of the trial of these 
issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the 
issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended 
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when the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the 
objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the admission of such evidence would 
prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense upon the merits. The court shall 
grant a continuance, if necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet such 
evidence. 
(c) Relation back of amendments. Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the 
amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or 
attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to 
the date of the original pleading. 
The third issue in this case is governed by URCP Rule 12 and 9(1) that states: 
Rule 12 (a ) . . . Unless otherwise provided by statute or order of the court, a 
defendant shall serve an answer... 
(b ) . . . Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any pleading, whether a 
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the 
responsive pleading thereto . . . 
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections not presented 
either by motion or by answer or reply... 
Rule 9 (1)(1) A party seeking to allocate fault to a non-party... shall file: 
(1)(1)(A) a description of the factual and legal basis on which fault can be 
allocated; and 
(1)(1)(B) information known or reasonably available to the party identifying the 
non-party, including name, address, telephone number and employer. If the 
identity of the non-party is unknown, the party shall so state. 
(1)(2) The information specified in subsection (1)(1) must be included in the party's 
responsive pleading if then known or must be included in a supplemental notice 
filed within a reasonable time after the party discovers the factual and legal basis 
on which fault can be allocated but no later than the deadline specified in the 
discovery plan under Rule 26(f). The court, upon motion and for good cause 
shown, may permit a party to file the information specified in subsection (1)(1) 
after the expiration of any period permitted by this rule, but in no event later than 
90 days before trial. 
(1)(3) A party may not seek to allocate fault to another except by compliance with 
this rule. 
STATEMENTS OF THE CASE/SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
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After initial discovery and the depositions of Dan and his son, Jacob McNeil 
(Dan's son, referred to as Jake herein) were taken in this case, Plaintiff, Jen Ottens, 
moved to add Jake as a party defendant. The Trial Court denied this motion because the 
statute of limitations had passed. The matter then proceeded to trial against Dan in 
December 2008. After two days of testimony, the Trial Court granted Defendant's 
Motion for Directed Verdict. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. FACTS RELEVANT TO TRIAL COURT'S DIRECTED VERDICT 
1. After a trial in the above matter between December 15-16,2008, the Defendant 
moved for a directed verdict. On February 13,2009, the Trial Court entered a Directed 
Verdict against Plaintiff. The Trial Court held: 
1. Plaintiffs oral motion to admit into evidence a statement offered by 
unknown individuals but alleged by plaintiff to be partially by Dan McNeil 
is denied. The court... allowed counsel for plaintiff to freely question Dan 
McNeil regarding this statement and allowed this evidence to go to the jury. 
The statement contains references to insurance which are contrary to this 
court's prior order in limine and is of unknown authorship and does not 
appear to be inherently reliable. 
3. The Court, having carefully considered Dan McNeil's motion for 
directed verdict, hereby grants the same. The court finds that there is no 
evidence upon which a reasonable juror could conclude that Jake McNeil 
was acting as an employee of or in the course and scope of employment 
with Dan McNeil personally. The court finds there is no basis from which 
vicarious liability would lie on the part of Dan McNeil for the actions of 
Jake McNeil. 
4. The Court further finds that there is no credible evidence upon which a 
juror could conclude that Dan McNeil breached a duty owed to the plaintiff 
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to secure the load in the truck owned by an driven by Jake McNeil. TR 
984-986. 
2. On March 29,2002, Dan P. McNeil was moving his property from his house in 
Bluffdale to his condo on Fort Union Boulevard at approximately 1300 East. Dan P. 
McNeil Trial Transcript (Dan TT) 3:11-14. 
3. Dan testified mat his son, Jake, his daughter and somebody else were there to 
assist him in the move. Dan TT 3:15-17. 
4. Dan was moving due to "the last deal with [him] and [his] wife, which included 
[his] 'office' and some of his 'personal stuff...'" Dan TT 3:18-21. 
5. Dan moved his personal things from the Bluffdale residence during this 
particular move, including his clothing and personal hygiene items. Dan TT 36:9-15. 
6. Dan however, during this move, did not move from the Bluffdale residence, 
"boxes of tax returns, miscellaneous stuff, tools, all [his] office, because [he] was still 
using the office." Dan TT 36:23-25; 37:1. 
7. Jake testified at trial that a divorce between his father, Dan, and Kim McNeil 
precipitated the move, and that Jake helped his father, Dan, move his personal belongings 
and his office out of his residence in Bluffdale, Utah to Dan's condo. Jake TT 7:10-25, 
8:14-20,9:11-24. 
8. Jake further testified at trial that in his truck he moved "some kitchen chairs," 
"a large wooden desk," "a dresser and probably a filing cabinet, [and] some boxes . . . " 
Jake TT 7:10-25, 8:14-20, 9:11-24. 
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9. As was pointed out at trial, at his deposition prior to trial, and contrary to his 
trial testimony, when Jake was asked what he moved for his father, Dan, he only indicated 
he moved a "kitchen table and chairs and some boxes." Jake did not mention any office 
equipment nor mention the word "office." Jake TT 8:21-25, 9:1-10. 
10. As was further pointed out at trial, at no time in his deposition prior to trial did 
Jake ever indicate that Dan and Jake were moving D & K Office equipment on the day of 
the accident. Jake TT 28:15-25,29:1-10. 
11. To transport the property, Dan testified that two trucks were backed up to the 
residence's porch and that he, "helped load both of them," and he also helped "secure the 
property in the vehicles." To secure the loads Dan helped his son, Jake, weave a rope by, 
"just throwing ropes back and forth and hooking them in the eye hooks." TT 7:19-25, 8: 
1,7-16,9:6-14. 
12. Dan did not use any tarps to secure the load. Moreover Dan did not inspect 
the loads to ensure they were secure. TT 7:19-25, 8:1,7-16,9:6-14. 
13. Jake testified that Dan was "directing the move," and that Dan "was 
supervising the loading of his possessions." Jake TT 24:8-10,29:8-10. 
14. Regarding the chair that caused the accident, Jake's personal opinion was that 
the chair "probably got missed when the ropes were getting looped through everything." 
Jake TT 19:1-20. 
15. Dan does not remember what was packed in either his or in Jake's truck. Dan 
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TT 23: 12-19. 
16. Dan recalls paying his son some, "gas money or something." Dan 
acknowledged at trial that in his deposition, he had testified that he had not given his son 
a check. Dan TT 8:2-6, 9:15-19,10:12-15. Jake, however, remembers getting paid 
through the D & K payroll for moving Dan's personal property. Jacob TT 14:3-25. 
17. At trial only, and not before, Dan's legal position was that his son, Jake, was 
working for D & K when he moved Dan's property and furniture. Dan TT 25:24-25; 26: 
1-5. 
18. Dan's business was D & K Finish Carpentry (D & K), which did finish work 
in houses. It was not a moving company. Dan TT 3:22-25,4:1-3. 
19. Jake, Dan's son, has worked for D& K multiple times throughout his life. At 
trial, Jake was asked during what time periods he was employed by D& K. After Jake 
was admonished by the Trial Judge, not to "guess" or "pull things out of the air," Jake 
indicated that he did work for D & K, "probably between 1992 and '94 and then again 
probably '95 or '96 through maybe 2001." Jake TT 3:15-25,4:1-17. As noted above at f 
2, the move and accident occurred on March 29,2002, and therefore, the accident 
occurred after Jake worked for D & K. 
20. According to Dan's trial and deposition testimony (which was presented at 
trial), after the trucks were fully loaded, Jake and a companion left first and then, 
approximately 15 minutes to 30 minutes after, Dan followed his son, Jake, with his loaded 
8 
vehicle. Dan TT 9:20-22,10:4-11,16-25,11: 1. 
21. On his way to his new apartment, Dan testified that he, "got almost there," and 
he, "called Jake on the cell phone, because [Dan] thought [he] recognized one of [his] 
black chairs on the side of the road." He saw the kitchen chair after 106th South around 
Costco. He told Jake that, "It looks like you're missing one," and that Dan would be 
there in a minute. The kitchen chair "was sitting on its back... on the side of the road by 
. . . a cement embankment... It didn't look damaged." Dan TT 11:6-25,12: 1-23. 
22. At trial, the following factual assertions made in the Second Amended 
Complaint, filed on August 27,2007, were pointed out to the jury as follows: 
"Jake McNeil was traveling northbound on 1-15 at about 11800 South on March 
29th, 2002, in a green 1996 Ford truck. At approximately 11:40 a.m. a chair fell 
from the truck driven by Jake McNeil and landed in the center lane. This chair had 
been loaded onto the truck under the direction of, on behalf of, and with the 
assistance of Dan McNeil. Dan McNeil had hired his son Jake McNeil and 
another unknown white male to assist him in loading and moving his personal 
property from a rental residence in Bluffdale, Utah to an apartment on 13th East 
7200 South. Mr. Dan McNeil paid Jake McNeil to assist him in transporting his 
personal property. The chair that fell out of the loaded truck was the personal 
property of Dan McNeil." Dan TT 27:3-16; 28:13-16; TR 376-382,429-433. 
23. After this was read to the Jury, Dan was asked at trial to read what his Answer 
was to these factual assertions in the Second Amended Complaint. He did so and read 
the following: 
"The defendant admits that a chair fell from the truck owned and driven by Jake 
McNeil and that the chair belongs to Dan McNeil, but denies the remainder of the 
allegations contained in this paragraph." Dan TT 27:3-16; 28:13-16; TR 422-428. 
24. However, contrary to Dan's position in this lawsuit and at trial, the Highway 
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Patrol Report (Plaintiffs Exhibit #2) identified Dan as the driver of the vehicle from 
which the kitchen chair fell that caused the accident in this case.1 TR 151 -153,155,157, 
992, Plaintiffs proposed trial Exh. 2. Dan was also identified as the driver in "Dan 
McNeil's Written Statement." TR 151-153,155,157, 992, Plaintiffs proposed trial Exh. 
2. Although Plaintiffs counsel was allowed to examine Dan regarding this document, as 
noted above in % 1, the trial judge prohibited its admission into evidence because it 
mentioned insurance and was hearsay. 
25. Nevertheless, in regards to the Highway Patrol Report about the accident, Dan 
identified the following handwritten notes therein to be similar to his handwriting: 
"Registered Owner, D&K Finish Carpentry" the address Dan was moving out of-
"15400 Pony Express Road, Utah, 84065;" Dan's phone number - "801-835-8915;" the 
driver's name - "Dan McNeil" Dan's date of birth - "11-29-55;" Dan's age at the time 
- "46;" Years of Dan's driving experience - "Twenty-nine;" the Ford truck from which 
the chair fell -"1996 Ford blue-green pickup truck." DanTT 15:4-25, 16:1-12; 17-19; 
20:1-19; TR 922. 
26. At in his deposition taken on August 10,2006, as was pointed out to the jury, 
Dan asserted that he could not recall talking to any officer about the accident. Dan TT 
33:5-8. 
1
 Dan cited for failure to secure his load, and in fact pled guilty and paid the ticket. 
This admission against interest was not allowed to be presented to the jury. 
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27. Jake testified that he first became aware that there had been an accident when 
his father, Dan, called him on "a work cell phone," and asked Jake what he was doing. 
Jake, "told him that [they] were about, three quarters of the way from unloading all the 
stuff. And [Dan] asked [Jake] to go count the chairs." Jake then went upstairs to the 
condo and counted the kitchen chairs. Jake TT 9:25,10:1-14. 
28. Jake testified that he counted the kitchen chairs and indicated to Dan that, 
"there were three," and then Dan responded, "well, I think one of the chairs fell out on the 
freeway so I'm going to go back and talk to the police officers." Jake TT 12:17-20. 
29. At the trial, Jake testified that when Dan called Jake, that Dan told Jake that 
Dan had been contacted by the police, and that, "they believ[ed] that one of his chairs was 
involved with an accident." Jake TT 9:10-16. 
30. At trial, it was brought to the jury's attention that in Jake's deposition taken 
prior to trial, Jake testified that Dan told him Dan was, "going to go back to where [he] 
saw the chair" and that Dan thought,"... one of the chairs fell out on the freeway so [he 
was] going to go back and talk to the police officers," and that Dan, "would go back and 
take care of it." Jake then told his father to let him know as soon as he found out what 
was going on. Jake TT 12:16-25,13:1-16. It was only after Jake had shared testimony in 
his deposition that Dan had admitted to speaking with a police officer, that Dan finally 
admitted at trial that he could remember a police officer "calling him" about the accident. 
Dan TT 32:15-17. 
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31. Jake did not see the chair fall from his vehicle. Jake TT 19:1 -20. 
32. While driving, Jake testified that he never changed lanes but that he, "stayed 
in the right hand lane, the slow lane, the whole way there.59 Jake TT 26:3-7. 
33. The Plaintiff testified that the chair flew out from a green truck when the truck 
changed lanes from the right lane to the center lane. TT 56:1-19. This was also indicated 
in the Highway Patrol Report. TR 152,922. 
35. In his answer, Dan never asserted the Defense of Corporate Shield, nor did he 
ever make a Rule 9(1) Designation of Fault that D & K bore any liability for the accident. 
He did, however, in a Rule 9(1) Designation of Fault and his Answers designate Jake and 
Jiffy Lube. TR 63, 69-70, 346 478. 
B. FACTS APPLICABLE TO COURT'S DENIAL OF MOTION TO AMEND 
36. This lawsuit was filed approximately on June 22,2005. TR 1-5. 
37. Plaintiffs complaint stated that on March 29,2002, Plaintiff Jennifer Ottens 
was traveling northbound on 1-15 at approximately 11800 South in Salt Lake County, 
Utah, in a 1992 Red Ford F150. The weather was sunny and dry and there was good 
visibility. TR2. 
38. Plaintiffs complaint alleged that as Ms. Ottens was driving, a chair flew out 
of a truck driven by Dan, and that she slowed to a stop in front of a chair and was then 
rear-ended and injured. TR 2. 
39. The Highway Patrol Report indicated that the accident was caused when a 
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chair flew out of the back of a pickup truck driven by Dan. Dan's address was indicated 
as being in Bluffdale, Utah. TR 922. 
40. Plaintiffs counsel sought to effect service upon Dan. TR 215-217. 
41. Plaintiff first tried to serve Dan in Salt Lake at the address Dan had indicated 
on the Highway Patrol Report but he had moved. Therefore, on Sept. 1,2005, Plaintiff 
had to submit an order to compel the Utah Dept. of Public Safety (UDPS) to release any 
address information it had of Dan's whereabouts. TR 11-14. Plaintiff obtained 
information and attempted to serve Dan at 1518 E. 4500 S. and then at 285 W. 100 S. 
Heber, Utah but each time he had moved ahead. TR 37,41, 51,168. Then, Plaintiff tried 
to serve Dan in Moab, Utah but this person, while sharing the same name, was the wrong 
individual. TR 160-161. 
42. Dan's auto insurance was Auto-Owners Insurance. Plaintiffs counsel 
requested that Auto Owners Insurance accept service on Defendant McNeil's behalf, or 
provide information so that he could be served, but it refused. TR 37,170-171. 
43. Auto Owners Insurance contacted the firm of Smith & Glauser, and 
communications between Mr. Lambert and Michael Wright of Smith & Glauser began 
regarding Mr. Wright accepting service on behalf of Auto-Owners Insurance. TR 47, 53-
54, 173,. 
44 . Mr. Wright indicated that his firm would accept service on behalf of 
Dan. TR 215-217 (Aff. Loren M. Lambert fflf 4-10). Several inquiries were placed by 
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Plaintiffs counsel's staff, and at least one voice mail message was left for Mr. Wright 
regarding the acceptance of service, and on two different occasions Mr. Wright requested 
an Acceptance of Service and it was sent to him in January, 2006. TR 56, 58, 173, 175, 
177, 224, 226,230. However, it was not until February 14,2006 that Mr. Wright 
informed Ms. Ottens' counsel that he had been instructed by Auto-Owners to not 
accept service. TR 47-48,62,179,228,230. 
45. Amidst these problems, on November 23,2005, Plaintiff filed a Motion for 
Alternate Service, which was granted December 1,2005. TR 36-39. Then, on February 
24, 2006, Plaintiff filed an Amended Motion for Alternate Service, which was granted 
March 6, 2006. TR 44-49. 
46. After the Amended Motion for Alternative Service was granted on March 6, 
2006, according to Dan's counsels, the insurance company: 
" . . . authorize[d] the expenditure of funds to skip trace Mr. [Dan] McNeil, which 
allowed [defense] counsel to contact the Defendant. At that point Mr. [Dan] 
McNeil authorized counsel to act on his behalf, and to accept service [on March 
13,2006]." TR63. 
47. Eventually, Dan filed an answer on March 27,2006. In the answer, Dan 
alleged that, "Mr. Jake McNeil... may have been operating the green ford pickup at the 
time of the accident and who may have been responsible for loading the vehicle." TR 63, 
69-70. 
48. Although Dan's Answer was signed on March 22,2006, it was not mailed 
until Friday, March 24, 2006, and Plaintiffs counsel did not receive it until March 27, 
14 
2006, only two days before the statute of limitations ran. TR 74. 
49. Without providing an address for his son, on May 1,2006, Dan indicated in 
his initial disclosures, that his son, Jake, "may have been driving the pick-up truck." TR 
82, 185-186. 
50. Also, on May 2,2006, in his answer to Plaintiffs first discovery request, sent 
immediately after the Answer was filed on March 29,2006, Dan indicated, "on 
information and belief," that his son, Jake, was the driver of the vehicle. TR 79, 92, 
190-192. 
51. Due to all of the problems in serving Dan, and due to Dan's equivocal 
assertions that "Jake McNeil... may have been operating the green ford pickup at the 
time of the accident and who may have been responsible for loading the vehicle," 
Plaintiffs counsel believed that Dan may have been purposely deceiving Plaintiffs 
counsel to avoid liability, or possibly acting so that the statute of limitations would pass. 
Therefore, before attempting to amend the complaint, Plaintiffs counsel desired to take 
both the depositions of Dan and Jake to attempt to specifically establish each person's 
role in the accident. TR 214-221 (Aff. Loren M. Lambert). 
52. Plaintiff immediately sought to take Dan and Jakes' depositions. Plaintiff sent 
a Notice of Deposition on April 18,2006 and started trying to locate Jake to subpoena 
him to a deposition on June 15,2006. But this date had to be canceled because Jake 
could not be located. TR 80,237,239. A second Notice of Depositions was sent on June 
15 
27,2006. TR 102. 
53. On June 14,2006, Dan provided an unsigned response to Plaintiffs second 
discovery request, sent on May 2,2006, indicating that his son, Jake McNeil's, address 
was 13517 South Skizzer Lane, Herriman, Utah 84065. TR 90. This address was not 
correct. On July 5,2006, Plaintiff requested further information thereon from Dan. TR 
199. In response, Dan McNeil's attorney's asserted by letter that the address was 
correct. TR 203. It was not Jake was eventually served for his deposition at his 
correct address of 13517 South Skipperling (not Skizzer) Lane. TR 104-106, 194-197, 
206 (Depo Jake 3:12-14). 
54. The depositions of Dan and his son, Jake, were taken on August 10, 2006. In 
those depositions, it was more conclusively determined that, contrary to the Highway 
Patrol report, Dan and his son, Jake, would assert that Jake was the driver of the truck 
from which the kitchen chair fell. TR 205-211. 
55. On Sept. 26,2006, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend her complaint to add 
Jake as a party defendant by alleging that he, along with his father, Dan, may have been 
negligent by failing to secure the chair and therefore it fell from his truck and thereby 
caused the accident. TR 109-123. 
56. The proposed amended complaint alleged that Plaintiff slowed to a stop or a 
near stop to avoid hitting the chair that flew allegedly from either Jake's or Dan's truck, 
and thereafter was struck from behind and injured. TR 109-123. 
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57. Plaintiff argued that, even though the statue of limitations had passed, she 
should have been allowed to amend her complaint and add Jake as a party defendant 
because Jake had "unity of interest" with Dan and because under the "Discovery 
Doctrine/' Dan had mislead Plaintiff into believing he was the driver of the vehicle. TR 
TR 115-123, 131-175. 
58. In ruling upon the Plaintiffs Motion to Amend, the Trial Court determined the 
following: 
Defendants oppose the motion... because it is legally futile, brought four (4) 
years from the date of the accident... and, thus, barred by the . . . statute of 
limitations . . . [and] the amendment would not relate back in time because there is 
not identity of interest between Jake and Dan McNeil... [since] these individuals 
do not have the same "legal position." 
Finally, argue Defendants, Plaintiff knew of the basis for the claim against 
Jake before the statue of limitations ran and, yet, failed to move to amend the 
Complaint for almost six (6) months thereafter. 
. . . [T]he Court finds granting the Plaintiffs Motion to Amend . . . is not 
proper because it is legally futile, being brought for years from the date of the 
accident... [U]nder the reasoning . . . in Penrose . . . the Complaint is time barred 
. . . and the amendment would not relate back because the requisite identity of 
interest between Jake and Dan McNeil is lacking. TR 242-243,261-262. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Based upon the legal principles discussed in Magana v. DRC, & ABM 
Crane Rental, 2009 UT 45, No. 2008629 (Utah 2009), there was sufficient evidence that 
Dan personally and vicariously is liable to Plaintiff and this claim should have been 
submitted to the jury. The evidence demonstrated that Dan was personally negligent in 
securing his kitchen chair and any negligence of his son, Jake, can be imputed to him. 
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Early in the litigation Plaintiff moved to join Jake McNeil as a party. Plaintiff 
demonstrated that Dan McNeil either intentionally or inadvertently engaged in deceptive 
practices that delayed Plaintiffs discovery of Jake's potential liability and therefore under 
the discovery rule and the "identity of interests" principle, Plaintiff should have been 
allowed to add Jake as a party in this case. 
Dan raised at trial, for the first time, that it was in the course and scope of his 
employment with D & K that he transported his kitchen chair to his condo and therefore 
he was shielded from any personal liability. Plaintiff argues that pursuant to URCP Rule 
9(1) and URCP Rule 15, the Trial Court should he have been barred from asserting this 
late found defense. In the alternative, Plaintiff argues that, pursuant to URCP Rule 12 
and the unity of interest rule that she should have been allowed to amend her complaint to 
add D & K as a party. Plaintiff asserts that it was an error to allow Dan to present this 
untimely defense and that the defense was inapplicable because Dan was acting outside 
his position as a corporate officer when he moved his kitchen chair. 
Plaintiff further argues that, to establish that Dan had control over the chair while 
its was being transported and to show that he owned it, she should have been allowed to 
introduce evidence that Dan pled guilty to and paid the fine for failure to secure the 
kitchen chair. Last, Plaintiff argues that Dan should not have been allowed to ask the jury 
to speculate when his counsel asked Plaintiff questions about her retaining representation 
on the matter. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. IN VIEW OF EVIDENCE OF DAN MCNEIL'S FAILURE TO SECURE HIS 
KITCHEN CHAIR, THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED LEGAL ERROR WHEN 
IT GRANTED DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT 
A. Dan McNeil's Liability to Plaintiff 
i. Factual Analysis 
On March 29, 2002, because of a divorce, Defendant Dan was moving his personal 
property from the marital residence in Bluffdale to a condo on Ft. Union Boulevard and 
1300 E. Dan TT 3:11-14. Dan's son Jake, among others, assisted Dan in the move. Dan 
TT 3:15-17. At trial, Dan and Jake asserted that Dan was transporting both his "office" 
and his "personal stuff...," "including his clothing and personal hygiene items," "a 
dresser," "kitchen table and chairs and some boxes." At depositions prior to trial and in 
his Answers, neither Dan, nor his son, Jake, alleged that Dan was moving his office, nor 
did Dan assert a defense under the Corporate Shield doctrine or make a Rule 9(1) 
designation of liability asking that D & K be designated a party for potential liability. 
Dan TT 3:18-21,36: 9-15. To the contrary, Dan affirmatively stated at trial that he did 
not move from the Bluffdale residence, "boxes of tax returns, miscellaneous stuff, tools, 
all [his] office, because [he] was still using the office." Dan TT 25:24-25; 26: 1-5, 36:23-
25; 37:1; Jake TT 7:10-25, 8:14-25, 9:1-24,28:15-25,29:1-10. 
Once at trial however, Dan argued, that even if any facts indicated that he or his 
son, Jake, acted negligently, that since he and his son were acting under the aegis of his 
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business, he was shielded from personal liability, and since the business was not a party 
defendant, their activities were irrelevant. Dan's business, D & K, did carpentry finish 
work in houses. At trial, Jake was asked during what time periods he was employed by 
D & K. After being admonished by the Trial Judge not to "guess" or "pull things out of 
the air," Jake indicated that he was employed by D & K, "probably between 1992 and '94 
and then again probably '95 or '96 through maybe 2001." Jake TT 3:15-25, 4:1 -17. The 
move and accident occurred on March 29,2002 - at a time when Jake no longer worked 
forD&K. 
D & K was not a moving company, nor did it assist couples who separated in 
divorce. Dan TT 3:22-25,4:1-3. Dan was moving to an upstairs condominium that 
would not accommodate a carpentry business. Furthermore, the property being moved 
that caused the accident was a chair from a kitchen table set - not a desk chair used in the 
D & K business. In view of this, a jury could have concluded that Dan and Jakes' 
recently contrived trial testimony about an "office move" was incredible and that the 
move was better characterized as one to transport Dan's personal property because of his 
divorce and had nothing to do with D & K's business operations. Therefore, any 
movement of D & K property, if any, was incidental to Dan's personal move and did not 
relate to this accident. 
During the move, Dan was both "directing the move," and "was supervising the 
loading of his possessions." Jake TT 24:8-10,29:8-10. Moreover, Dan testified he, 
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"helped load both of [the 'two trucks . . . backed up to the residence's porch']," and he 
also helped, "secure the property in the vehicles," by, "just throwing ropes back and forth 
and hooking them in the eye hooks." This is contrary to the trial judge's statements that 
there was, "not evidence that supports that Dan [was Jake's] employer," that all the 
evidence was that, "Dan was one person loading, but mostly directing from in the house 
what to take," that, "there [was] no evidence of means and the methods of loading," and 
finally that the trial judge, "didn't hear evidence that [Dan] was in fact helping to secure 
[the kitchen chair/load in the truck]." TT 20:15-16; 21:8-12,23-24; 39:21-22.. 
Dan did not inspect the loads nor use any tarps to secure them. TT 7:19-25, 8:1, 
7-16, 9:6-14. Jake's personal opinion was that the chair that blew out, "probably got 
missed when the ropes were getting looped through everything." Jake TT 19:1-20. Dan 
recalls paying his son some, "gas money or something," for the move. Dan TT 8:2-6, 
9:15-19, 10:12-15. Jake, although per his own testimony was not an employee of D & K 
at the time, remembers getting paid through the D & K payroll for moving Dan's 
"personal property -not his office. Jacob TT 14:3-25,15:1-8.2 Interestingly during 
argument on the Directed Verdict, when Plaintiffs counsel recited Jake's trial testimony 
that he had been paid to the court, the judge stated, "No, he didn't... Mr. Glauser?" Mr. 
2
 Q: You indicated you were paid, correct? A: Yes, the company did this for the day 
Q: And were you able to completely finish moving your father's property... ? A: . . . Just 
helped during the eight hour period I was there for work... Q: And he did pay you on the 
paycheck correct? He put the time that you spent moving his personal property on your 
paycheck, correct? A: Yes. TT:14:3-5,16-23; 15:5-8. 
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Glauser: "No." TT 6:5-10. The trial judge further stated, " . . . I'm not even close to 
hearing that he was working for his father, employed by his father..." TT 7:24-25. 
Contrary to the Trial Court's statement, a jury could conclude from Jake and Dans' 
testimony that Dan was supervising the move and was maintaining control over the 
manner and method in which his kitchen chair was being packed, loaded and secured by 
both him, Jake and others and that Dan, even though he improperly paid his through the D 
& K payroll, hired Jake for a day to move his personal property. 
Dan does not know what was packed in either his or in Jake's truck. Dan TT 23 : 
12-19. After the trucks were fully loaded, Jake and a companion left first and then, 
approximately 15 minutes to 30 minutes after, Dan followed his son, Jake, in his loaded 
vehicle. Dan TT 9:20-22, 10:4-11,16-25, 11:1. On his way, Dan, "got almost there," 
and he, "called Jake on the cell phone, because [he] thought [he] recognized one of [his] 
black chairs on the side of the road," near 106th S. around Costco. The chair "was sitting 
on its back... on the side of the road by . . . a cement embankment... It didn't look 
damaged." He told Jake that, "It looks like you're missing one," and that Dan would be 
there in a minute. Dan TT 11:6-25,12: 1-23. 
Dan and Jakes' position in these proceedings and at trial has been that the chair fell 
from the vehicle Jake was driving. Dan TT 27:3-16; 28:13-16. Contrarily, the police 
report containing, "Dan McNeil's Written Statement," identified Dan as the driver of the 
vehicle from which the chair fell that caused the accident in this case. TR 151, 153, 155, 
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157, 992, Plaintiffs proposed trial Exh. 2. In regards thereto, Dan identified the 
following handwritten notes in the Highway Patrol Report to be "similar" to his 
handwriting: "Registered Owner, D&K Finish Carpentry;" the address Dan was moving 
out of- "15400 Pony Express Road, Utah 84065;" Dan's phone number - "801-835-
8915? the driver's name - "Dan McNeil;" Dan's date of birth - "11-29-55;" Dan's age at 
the time - "46;" Years of Dan's driving experience - "Twenty-nine;" allegedly Jake's 
Ford truck from which the chair fell - "1996 Ford blue-green pickup truck" Dan TT 
15:4-25, 16:1-12; 17-19; 20:1-19, TR 992, Plaintiff s proposed trial Exh. 2. 
Contrary to the Trial Judge's view otherwise, a jury had a right to view this 
evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff and conclude that Dan was the driver of 
the vehicle. TT 38:18-24. 
Moreover, while Dan (after he knew about Jake's testimony to the contrary) 
testified at trial that he could remember a police officer calling him about the accident, 
(Dan TT 32:15-17), in his deposition taken on August 10,2006, he denied talking to any 
officer about the accident. Dan TT 33:5-8. Interestingly, Jake became aware of the 
accident when Dan called him. Dan told Jake that he had been contacted by the police. 
Dan had Jake count the kitchen chairs to see of one was missing and then Dan told Jake, 
"well, I think one of the chairs fell out on the freeway so I'm going to go back ['to where 
I saw the chair'] and talk to the police officers." Dan told Jake that the police, " . . . 
believ[ed] that one of his chairs was involved with an accident," and Dan, "would go 
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back and take care of it" Jake TT 9:10-16,25,10:1-14,12:16-25, 13:1-16. 
Jake, himself, did not see the chair fall from his vehicle. Jake TT 19:1 -20. While 
driving, Jake claims he never changed lanes but that he, "stayed in the right hand lane, the 
slow lane, the whole way there." Jake TT 26:3-7. However, the Plaintiff testified that the 
chair flew out from the truck when the truck changed lanes from the right hand lane to the 
center lane. TT 56:1-19. This was also indicated in the Highway Patrol Report. TR 152, 
922, 
This testimony and evidence raises the following questions. Why was Dan 
identified as the driver on the Highway Patrol Report? How did handwriting, according 
to Dan, "similar to his" end up on the Highway Patrol Report identifying Dan as the 
driver when Dan says he was not? Next, given that the accident happened immediately 
after the chair flew out of the truck, how is it that Dan, who followed his son within 15 to 
30 minutes, did not come upon the accident, yet claims to have seen the chair and to have 
identified it as laying on the side of the road? How is it that Dan denied mentioning 
having spoken to police officers at his deposition when his son, Jake, at his deposition 
indicated that Dan had told Jake that police had contacted him, and that Dan was going to 
go back to speak to the officers to clear things up, and then only at trial admitted that he 
had indeed spoken to police officers? Lastly, if it is true that Jake never changed lanes 
during his commute, why is it that the Plaintiff and the Highway Patrol Report indicate 
that the chair, belonging to Dan, blew from a vehicle changing lanes from the right lane to 
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the center lane? 
The fair inferences from the evidence that can be drawn in Plaintiffs favor to 
answer these questions are that for some unknown reason, Dan and Jake, father and son, 
are not being truthful about what happened, and in fact, Dan was driving the truck from 
which his kitchen chair flew onto the highway, and that he saw the chair blow out and 
cause the accident. Dan then returned, and spoke to the officers and personally filled out 
the report identifying himself as the driver of the vehicle. These facts are sufficient under 
several different legal theories to have submitted the question of Dan's alleged negligence 
to the Jury. 
ii. Legal Analysis 
a. Retained Control and Direct Liability 
In, Magana v. DRC, & ABM Crane Rental, 2009 UT 45, No. 2008629 (Utah 2009) 
[Addendum Exhibit A], the plaintiff, Mangana, alleged that DRC (a business entity), 
through its agent/employee, Brett Campbell was negligent and caused Magana's 
paraplegia when a load of tresses, being hoisted by a crane being operated by ABC, 
became unbalanced and fell upon him. DRC and its agent, Brett Campbell, hired ABC to 
operate the crane to hoist the tresses. Immediately prior to the accident, DRC agent, Brett 
Campbell, assisted ABC agent, Ted Alexander, in rigging the tresses. 
Mr. Magana alleged that DRC was liable to him because: (1) Under the retained 
control doctrine, it actively participated in ABC's execution of its duties, and (2) DRC's 
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agent, Brett Campbell, had negligently assisted in rigging the tresses. In ruling upon 
these two theories of liability, the Utah Supreme Court found that while there was 
insufficient evidence under the doctrine of retained control to hold the DRC liable, there 
was sufficient evidence for a jury to consider that due to DRC agent, Brett Campbell's, 
negligence, DRC was liable. 
As in Magana , just as DRC agent, Brett Campbell, and ABC agent, Ted 
Alexander, negligently rigged the tresses causing them to fall upon Magana while being 
transported by ABC/Ted Alexander, Dan and Jake improperly secured or "rigged" Dan 
McNeil's kitchen chair in the truck being driven by either Jake or Dan. As a 
consequence, while Dan's kitchen chair was being transported, it flew out causing an 
accident. Notably, neither the crane operation in Magana, nor the truck operation in this 
case, were alleged to have been negligent. Hence, the means by which the tresses and the 
kitchen chair were transported is irrelevant to the legal analysis in both cases. Rather, it 
was the manner in which the tresses and kitchen chair were secured. Also, as in Magana, 
the Plaintiff alleges that Dan is individually liable to her for improperly securing or 
"rigging" the load, and Dan is liable to Plaintiff because he exercised sufficient control 
over those who assisted him in loading, rigging and transporting his kitchen chair to the 
extent that he had a duty to Plaintiff to make sure that the load was properly "rigged" or 
secured. 
In Magana , the Utah Supreme Court stated that to apply the retained control 
26 
doctrine, it must be shown that an employer actively participated in the behavior that 
causes the injury. Active participation means that the employer "directs that the 
contracted work be done by use of a certain mode or otherwise interferes with the means 
and methods by which the work is to be accomplished," to such a degree that the 
independent contractor cannot carry out in its own way the injury-causing aspect of the 
work. To determine if this is the case, the Supreme Court established a two-step analysis. 
First, it must be determined whether the employer actively participated in the contractor's 
work by directing that the contracted work be done by use of a certain mode or otherwise 
interfere with the means and method by which the work is to be accomplished and 
thereby assumes a limited duty of care to ensure that the work was conducted safely. The 
second step is to determine whether the employer breached that duty of care. 
Using this standard, in Magana the Supreme Court determined that since DRC did 
not, "direct, instruct, or control the manner in which" ABC and its agents conducted the 
operation, there was no liability under the theory of the retained control doctrine. 
However, since Magana testified that DRC's agent, Brett Campbell, "had assisted in the 
rigging of the load of tresses that slipped and fell on Magana," the question of whether or 
not this caused the injury to Magana was a question of fact that should have been 
submitted to a jury. 
In this case, the question of whether or not Dan was liable to Plaintiff for the 
accident should have been submitted to the jury. Under the Doctrine of Retained Control 
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the facts and all inferences that can be drawn therefrom indicate that Dan supervised and 
maintained control over the loading and securing of his kitchen chair onto the trucks, and 
that Dan also personally used a certain mode or means to secure the loads with ropes so 
that Jake did not act independently in loading the property as an independent contractor. 
Moreover, the facts and all inferences that can be drawn therefrom indicate that 
Dan's involvement in the loading and securing of his personal property established a duty 
to the Plaintiff. Dan should have done so in a manner that did not create a known hazard 
to others when the kitchen chair was being transported, regardless of whether or not he 
was the driver of the vehicle that was transporting the kitchen chair when it flew out. He 
therefore had a duty to have secured the chair. 
b. Employer, Employee, Vicarious Liability 
Here, however, unlike the Magana case, the legal status and capacity of the joint 
players, Dan and Jake, is disputed. It is Plaintiffs position that Dan was engaged in a 
wholly personal affair and employed his son, Jake, to assist him. Dan, at trial, asserted 
that he was transporting the kitchen chair as an agent for D & K Finishing, and that Jake, 
while assisting in the move, was either a volunteer, an independent contractor or an 
employee for D & K. 
Black's Law Dictionary defines the word "employee" as "[a] person in the service 
of another under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written, where the 
employer has the power or right to control and direct the employee in the material details 
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of how the work is performed." Black's Law Dictionary 471 (5th ed. 1979). This 
definition was echoed by the Utah Supreme Court in Western Casualty & Sur. Co. v. 
Mar chant, 615 P.2d 423,426 (Utah 1980), in which the court stated that "[i]n general, it 
can be said that an employee is one who is hired for compensation, for a substantial 
period of time, to perform duties wherein he is subject to a comparatively high degree of 
direction and control by the one who hires him." 
In viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, a reasonable jury 
could conclude that Dan, due to a divorce, had to quickly move his personal property, 
including his kitchen chair. He temporarily hired his son for a substantial period of 
time-a entire work day-to assist moving his personal property and paid him a days wages 
through the D & K payroll account. 
Defendant, Dan, will argue that since it presented testimony at trial for the first 
time that the move allegedly included D & K office property, and since Jake testified that 
he was paid with a D & K payroll check, that the entire move was per se done for and on 
behalf of D & K. Dan will further argue that since the move was a D & K operation, 
equivalent to building cabinets, and since D & K was not a party, that it could raise, also 
for the first time, the Corporate Shield doctrine. In raising this defense, Dan argues and 
the trial judge agreed, that even if one office pen was transported in the move, he is, per 
se, ipso facto, cloaked by the corporate shield and not liable to Plaintiff. This is 
incorrect. 
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Although it is true that: 
"[A]n officer or director of a corporation is not personally liable for torts of the 
corporation or of its other officers and agents merely by virtue of holding corporate 
office, but can only incur personal liability by participating in the wrongful 
activity/5 Armed Forces Ins. Exch. v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14,119, 70 P.3d 35. 
It is also true that: 
"Furthermore, a corporate officer or director can incur personal liability for 
his own acts even though the action is done in furtherance of the corporate 
business. See Armed Forces Ins. Exch., 2003 UT 14 at 119, 70 P.3d 35 (Utah 
2003). 
Therefore pursuant to Armed Forces Ins. Exch., Dan can have personal liability 
for his own acts even though the action is done in furtherance of the corporate 
business. 
In Bennett v. Huish, 155 P.3d 917, 931, 932 (UT 2007), the trial and appellate 
court found that, although Defendant Grant S. Huish was allegedly acting on behalf of a 
business entity, he was personally liable for Plaintiffs' damages. In Bennett, the 
Defendants claimed that the Corporate Shield defense cloaked Huish in an impermeable 
barrier that protected him from incurring personal liability. In ruling otherwise, the Court 
stated: 
[A] corporate officer or director can incur personal liability for his own acts even 
though the action is done in furtherance of the corporate business. (Citations 
omitted). 
. . . We conclude that Defendants' corporate shield defense fails because 
Huish personally committed acts in breach of his fiduciary duty to Plaintiffs which 
resulted in damage to Plaintiffs. 
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Moreover, as noted in footnote 15, the Huish plaintiffs asserted that because the 
Corporate Shield defense was not raised by the Defendants in their answer, or at any time 
prior to trial, it was waived. The Trial Court agreed therewith. Dan, likewise, never 
raised the Corporate Shield defense in any of his answers. Moreover, URCP Rule 9(1) 
states that: 
A party seeking to allocate fault to a non-party... shall file: 
(1)(1)(A) a description of the factual and legal basis on which fault can be 
allocated; and (1)(1)(B) information known or reasonably available to the party 
identifying the non-party, including name, address, telephone number and 
employer... 
(1)(2) The information specified in subsection (1)(1) must be included in the 
party fs responsive pleading if then known . . . but in no event later than 90 days 
before trial. 
(1)(3) A party may not seek to allocate fault to another except by compliance with 
this rule. 
URCP Rule 12 (a), (b) and (h) state: 
( a ) . . . Unless otherwise provided by statute or order of the court, a defendant shall 
serve an answer . . . 
(b ) . . . Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any pleading, whether a 
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the 
responsive pleading thereto . . . 
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections not presented 
either by motion or by answer or reply... 
Here, Dan never made a Rule 9 designation to allocate any fault to D & K nor did 
he assert a corporate shield defense as required by UCRP Rule 12. 
In conclusion, it was an error for the Trial Court to have concluded that, "there is 
no credible evidence upon which a juror could conclude that Dan McNeil breached a duty 
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owed to the plaintiff to secure the load in the truck," and it was an error for the Trial 
Court to have concluded that, "there is no evidence upon which a reasonable juror could 
conclude that Jake McNeil was acting on behalf of Dan McNeil personally." 
II. DUE TO DAN MCNEIL'S DECEPTION TO LAW ENFORCEMENT 
REGARDING THE DRIVER OF THE VEHICLE, THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED 
ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO JOIN JAKE 
MCNIEL AS A PARTY 
Prior to trial, under the Discovery Rule and the Unity of Interest doctrine, Plaintiff 
asked that she be allowed to amend her complaint to add Jake as a Defendant. 
A. The Court Should Have Granted the Motion to Amend. 
i. Factual Analysis 
In this case, the Highway Patrol Report identified Dan as the driver of the car and 
owner of the chair. TR 151-153,155,157,992, Plaintiffs proposed trial Exh. 2. Based 
on this information, Plaintiff filed her complaint against Dan as a defendant. The 
Plaintiff then took extraordinary measures to serve Dan. She pursued him first in 
Bluffdale. Then, with information subpoenaed from the Utah Dept. of Public Safety, she 
attempted to serve Dan at 1518 E. 4500 S. and then at 285 W. 100 S. Heber, Utah. TR 
37, 41,168. Then, she thought she located him in Moab, Utah. TR 41, 51,160-161. 
She then attempted to secure the cooperation of Dan's auto insurance, Auto-
Owners Insurance and then his appointed attorneys. The attorneys at first said they would 
accept service. TR 37,47, 53-54,173,170-171. She also obtained the Court's 
permission to effect alternative service on Dan, at which time Dan's attorney accepted 
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service on March 13,2006. TR 44-49,56, 58,62,63,173,175,177,179,215-217,224, 
226, 228, 230 (Aff. Loren M. Lambert fflf 4-10). So, after eight months of diligent effort 
to track down Dan and then asking the insurance company and its attorneys to accept 
service, Dan's attorneys finally did so on March 13,2006. TR 63. 
Dan filed an answer on March 27,2006. Although Dan's Answer was signed on 
March 22, 2006, it was not mailed until Friday, March 24,2006 and Plaintiffs counsel 
did not receive it until March 27,2006 - only two days before the statute of limitations 
ran. In his answer, Dan alleged that, "Mr. Jake McNeil... may have been operating the 
green ford pickup at the time of the accident and who may have been responsible for 
loading the vehicle." TR 63, 69-70, 74. 
Then, in initial disclosures and discovery, Dan vaguely alleged that Jake, "may 
have been driving the pick-up truck." He also gave incorrect location information for 
his son. TR 79, 82, 92, 185-186, 190-192. As a consequence, Plaintiff was justifiably 
skeptical of Dan's allegation, and therefore sought to take Dan and Jakes' depositions. 
This could not be done until August 10,2006, in large part because of Dan's 
misinformation. TR 80, 90, 102, 104-106,194-197, 199,203,206,214-221, 237, 239, 
Depo Jake 3:12-14. Per Dan and his son, Jakes' depositions, it first became apparent that 
the two would assert that Jake was the driver of the truck from which the kitchen chair 
fell. TR 205-211. Therefore, after Dan mislead everyone in the accident report that he 
was the driver, after eight months of trying to serve Dan, after Dan provided 
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misinformation of his son's whereabouts, and after finally clarifying Dan's equivocal 
remarks that Jake may have been driving, on Sept. 26,2006, only 36 days after taking 
their depositions, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend her complaint to add Jake as a party 
defendant. TR 109-123, 109-123. 
Dan opposed the Motion and the Trial Court held: 
Defendants oppose the motion... because it is legally futile, brought four (4) 
years from the date of the accident... and, thus, barred by the . . . statute of 
limitations . . . [and] the amendment would not relate back in time because there is 
not identity of interest between Jake and Dan McNeil... [since] these individuals 
do not have the same "legal position." 
Finally, argue Defendants, Plaintiff knew of the basis for the claim against 
Jake before the statue of limitations ran and, yet, failed to move to amend the 
Complaint for almost six (6) months thereafter. 
. . . [T]he Court finds granting the Plaintiffs Motion to Amend . . . is not 
proper because it is legally futile, being brought four years from the date of the 
accident... [U]nder the reasoning . . . in Penrose . . . the Complaint is time barred. 
. . and the amendment would not relate back because the requisite identity of 
interest between Jake and Dan McNeil is lacking. TR 242-243,261-262. 
ii. Legal Analysis 
a. The Discovery Rule Tolled the Statute of Limitations 
In, Beaver County v. Tax Commission, 2006 P.3d 6, 12 (Utah 2006), the Utah 
Supreme Court explained: 
The discovery rule operates to "toll the period of limitations until the discovery of 
facts forming the basis for the cause of action," [W]here the party can make "an 
initial showing . . . that [he] did not know of and could not reasonably have known 
of the existence of the cause of action in time to file a claim within the limitation 
period." Indeed, we have noted that in Utah "the principle of equitable tolling . . . 
has been developed almost exclusively through application of the discovery rule." 
(Citations omitted.) 
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In Russell Packard Development, Inc. v. Carson, 2005 P.3d 741 (Utah 2005), the 
Utah Supreme Court analyzed the many rules and principles that allow a tolling of the 
statute of limitations. It stated: 
We have limited the circumstances in which an equitable discovery rule may 
operate to toll an otherwise fixed statute of limitations period to the following two 
situations: (1) [inapplicable to this case] . . . and (2) "where the case presents 
exceptional circumstances and the application of the general rule would be 
irrational or unjust, regardless of any showing that the defendant has prevented the 
discovery of the cause of action." . . . We have previously suggested that these 
"concealment'' and "exceptional circumstances" versions of the equitable 
discovery rule may apply even where a statute of limitations contains a statutory 
discovery rule . . . 
. . . [W]hen a defendant fraudulently causes a plaintiff to delay in bringing a cause 
of action, the discovery rule balances (1) the policy underlying all statutes of 
limitations "'to promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of 
claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories 
have faded, and witnesses have disappeared/" . . . , with (2) the policy of "not 
allowing a defendant who has concealed his wrongdoing to profit from his 
concealment," id. If we were to look only to whether a plaintiff theoretically 
could have brought a suit before the limitations period expired without looking to 
the relative reasonableness or unreasonableness of that action under the 
circumstances, we would reward a defendant's fraudulent and deceptive 
misbehavior by depriving an innocent plaintiff of a reasonable period within which 
to act. This we refuse to do . . . 
For the concealment version of the equitable discovery rule to toll a statute of 
limitations until a plaintiffs discovery of the facts forming the basis for the cause 
of action, a plaintiff must demonstrate either (1) [inapplicable to this case ] . . . ; or 
(2) that notwithstanding the plaintiffs actual or constructive knowledge of the 
facts underlying his or her cause of action within the limitations period, a 
reasonably diligent plaintiff may have delayed in filing his or her complaint until 
after the statute of limitations expired. 
In this case, since it was difficult to locate Dan to serve him, since Dan McNeil 
mislead the Plaintiff by identifying himself as the driver of the vehicle from which the 
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chair flew, and since Dan then equivocated about his son, Jake's, alleged involvement in 
the accident and gave incorrect information about his son's residence, it is reasonable that 
the Plaintiff did not immediately name or seek to name Jake as a defendant until the 
statute of limitation had run and after the depositions. Therefore, until it became evident 
that Dan and Jake would claim that Jake was the driver, the statute of limitations was 
tolled under the discovery rule. 
Moreover, the Trial Court never addressed this argument made by Plaintiff (TR 
117-123, 121-122) nor did it analyze any of the facts presented to it on Plaintiffs motion. 
The Court's have held that the Trial Court must make findings on all material issues, and 
its failure to do so constitutes reversible error "unless the facts in the record are 'clear, 
uncontro verted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment.'" 
Acton v. J.B. Deliran, 131 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987) (quoting Kinkella v. Bough, 660 
P.2d 233,236 (Utah 1983)). In addition, the findings must be sufficiently detailed and 
consist of enough subsidiary facts to reveal the steps the court took to reach its conclusion 
on each factual issue presented. Acton, 131 P.2d at 999; Lee v. Lee, 744 P.2d 1378, 1380 
(Utah Ct.App. 1987). Here the Trial Court failed to indicate why the discovery rule did 
not apply to Plaintiffs motion to amend and therefore it abused its discretion. 
b. Is There an Identity of Interest Between Dan and Jake? 
Dan will assert that, despite the fact that he enlisted the services of his son, Jake, to 
move his personal property, they were not engaged in a joint or common enterprise, and 
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therefore there was no identity of interest that would allow the amendment to relate back 
to the time the original complaint was filed. 
In support of his argument, Defendant will assert, as did the Trial Court, that in 
Penrose v. Ross, 71 P.3d 63 (Ut. App. 2003), "the Court of Appeals determined that an 
identity of interest only exists if the party named in the amended pleading has the same 
'legal position' as the party initially named, and it may not be based on a claim that the 
party (or his insurer) knew of the suit when it was filed." Defendant will claim that Dan 
and Jake do not have the same legal position. He will argue that not only will Dan blame 
Jake for failing to secure his kitchen chair, but that Jake, who is liable only for his own 
negligence under the Utah Comparative Fault Statute, will most likely assert that Dan was 
negligent because of his failure to secure the chair. Therefore, Defendant argues: 
Since both parties may be expected to point to the other as the only person liable 
for the negligence, they do not have the same "legal position" with respect to the 
claim, and therefore there is no identity of interest and the claim does not relate 
back. 
This is an overly broad and simplistic interpretation of Penrose, 71 P.3d 631 (Ut. 
App. 2003) . In Penrose, on November 17, 2000, just days prior the statute of limitation's 
expiration, Penrose filed a complaint for negligence (Original Complaint) against 
Christopher Ross (Father/Chris) and Does 1-5. The Original Complaint in Penrose 
alleged that Father/Chris, as the driver of the vehicle, and Does 1-5, failed to keep a 
proper look-out and negligently caused an accident. On December 27,2000, after the 
statute of limitations had run, Penrose filed an Amended Complaint, identifying the 
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Father's son, Son/Ross, as the person who negligently drove the car. Aside from 
substituting the identity of the negligent party, the Amended Complaint was identical to 
the Original Complaints. 
On January 5,2001, Father/Chris filed an affidavit denying he was the driver, and 
including "a copy of the police report [Highway Patrol Report] that identified 
[Son] Ross [again, his son] as the driver of the car that collided with Penrose." 
Pursuant to a Motion for Summary Judgment, Son/Ross successfully asserted before the 
trial court and on appeal that the statute of limitations barred the action against him. 
In this case, unlike Penrose, Plaintiff, Jen Ottens, did not have a police report that 
correctly identified Jake as the driver of the vehicle. The Highway Patrol Report 
identified Dan as the driver. Moreover, it appears Dan was in fact driving the truck, or he 
intentionally misled the police regarding the truck's driver. In his deposition, Jake 
indicated that Dan told him that he was going to go speak with the police to clear up the 
situation. JakeTT 12:16-25, 13:1-16; TR 205-208 [Depo Jake 8:19-25, 9:1-5, 15:13-24, 
17:2-18]. Despite the Highway Patrol Report and Jake's testimony, Dan denied this in his 
deposition. TR 209-211 [Depo Dan 20:14-18]. This would tend to indicate that Dan did 
speak with the police and did represent, either correctly or falsely, to the police that he 
was the driver - therefore, it was reasonable that Plaintiff identified Dan as the driver of 
truck from which the kitchen chair fell. 
In its analysis, the court in Penrose stated: 
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Utah courts have allowed the relation back of amendments to complaints 
incorporating newly named parties in two types of cases: (1) in so called 
"misnomer cases/' and (2) where there is a true "identity of interest." 
. . . [I]t cannot be argued that Penrose merely made a technical mistake in naming 
Father as the negligent driver, because, as evidenced by the police report, Penrose 
was given notice at the scene of the accident that [Son/]Ross was the driver and 
Father was the owner of the vehicle. 
Contrary to Penrose, Plaintiff, Jen Ottens, can argue that she made "a technical 
mistake in naming [Dan] as the negligent driver," because the Highway Patrol Report 
named Father/Dan as both the driver and the owner of the vehicle. 
In its analysis of "identity of interest," the court in Penrose at 635-636, stated: 
Black's Law Dictionary defines "identity" as "[t]he identical nature of two or more 
things." Webster's defines identity as "sameness of essential or generic character 
in different instances" and "the condition of being the same with something 
described or asserted." Therefore, an identity of interest requires parties to have 
the "same" interest. This definition is supported by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Attorney General v. Pomeroy,... In Pomeroy, the issue before the court was 
whether a final judgment as to one issue in a case with multiple parties was 
effective as to all parties for the purpose of an appeal. The court applied the 
"identity of interest" test, which it defined as "whether the determination of the 
issues as to any Defendant depends on or affects the determination of the issues as 
to the other Defendants." 
Similarly, in Nunez v. Albo, . . . this court determined that an identity of 
interest existed between an employer and an employee, permitting an amendment 
to the complaint adding the employer as a party to the complaint... In 
determining whether the amended complaint related back to the original complaint, 
this court analyzed Rule 15(c) and cases outlining the exception permitting the 
addition of parties where an identity of interest is established. 
We held that an identity of interest existed between the Hospital and the 
physician because the cause of action "'arose out of the conduct, transaction, or 
occurrence set forth... in the original pleading.'" This court also noted that the 
Hospital had potential vicarious liability as the employer of the physician. Further, 
the University provided legal counsel for the physician, asserting that the physician 
was acting within the scope of his employment by the Hospital and was entitled to 
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the protections of the Governmental Immunity Act. 
In Nunez, any disposition of the case against the physician would 
necessarily affect the Hospital's liability. Thus, an identity of interest existed 
because the legal position and defenses of the two parties were the "same." 
(Citations omitted). 
Similarly, as in Nunez v. Albo, whether or not Dan paid his son, Jake, to help him 
move his kitchen chair, their relationship at the time was identical to that of an employer 
and employee. Therefore, "an identity of interest existed between" them, "permitting an 
amendment to the complaint adding the [employee] as a party to the complaint." This is 
true because, despite the fact that Dan and Jake may point fingers at each other (which 
does not preclude the existence of an identity of interest), they, in fact, have an "identity 
of interest existing] between" them just as "the Hospital" in Nunez had "an identity of 
interest with the physician because the cause of action 'arose out of the conduct, 
transaction, or occurrence set forth... in the original pleading.'" It is therefore irrelevant 
that, in Nunez, the Hospital could have claimed that the doctor was an independent 
contractor and solely negligent, or the doctor could have claimed the Hospital was 
somehow solely negligent. 
This is true because, as in Nunez, the "court [should] also [note] that [Dan has] 
potential vicarious liability as the employer of [Jake McNeil his son]." Moreover, this is 
true and consistent with in Nunez, because, "the [insurance company will most likely 
provide] legal counsel for [Jake McNeil], asserting that [he] was acting within the scope 
of his employment [with Dan] and [is] entitled to the [same defenses that neither was 
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liable because as asserted by Defendant, it is the other Defendants who failed to come to a 
complete stop behind Ms. Jen Ottens' car that caused the accident]. Hence, as in Nunez, 
"any disposition of the case against the [Jake McNeil] would necessarily affect the [Dan 
McNeil's] liability. Thus, an identity of interest [exists] because the legal position and 
defenses of the two parties [are] the same," even though they may have other defenses to 
allow them to blaine each other. 
Although the relationship of father to son between Dan and Jake is "on all fours" 
with Penrose, as is the allegation that Dan was not the driver, the similarities stop there. 
The differences are, nonetheless, substantial and material. In Penrose, the proper party 
(the son, Ross) was identified in the police report, and the Father and Ross, the son, were 
not engaged in any common enterprise in which the father was directing the activities of 
the son and participating in their execution. Hence, in applying the law to the facts, in 
Penrose the court noted that since, "A disposition as to either party does not affect the 
claims or defenses available to the other party. Thus, where they do not have the 'same' 
legal interest there is no identity of interest." Id. at 636-637. This is not the case here. 
The substantiated fact that the father, Dan, was directing the activities of his son, Jake, in 
loading and moving his personal property creates an identity of interest because of their 
common enterprise. And, as to this common enterprise, they have similar defenses and 
claims. Most importantly, the cause of action against them both arises "out of the 
conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth... in the original pleading." Also see, 
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Conder v. Hunt, 2000 UT App 105, f 9,1 P.3d 558 (noting that claim preclusion applies 
in limited exception for those in privity with one another evaluated by the parties' identity 
of interest); James Constructors, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 888 P.2d 665, 669 (Utah 
Ct.App.1994) (stating an identity of interest exists between principal and surety in the 
context of indemnity). 
Moreover, as noted in footnote 6 in Penrose, Nunez v. Albo, 53 P.3d 2, also 
addressed Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requiring that amendments 
should be permitted "when justice so requires." Here, in view of the incorrect 
information on the Highway Patrol Report, justice tips the scales in Plaintiffs favor. 
Plaintiff should not be faulted for the delay in taking the depositions of Jake and Dan, so 
that their liability could be established and so that an appropriate Motion to Amend could 
be filed based upon the information these individuals provided. 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, the Plaintiff requests this Court overturn the 
Trial Court and grant her Motion to Amend the complaint to add Jake as a party. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT ALLOWED DAN TO ASSERT HIS 
CORPORATE SHIELD DEFENSE AND DENIED PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
ADD D & K AS A PARTY DEFENDANT 
As stated above in Section I, Dan asserted at trial, for the first time in the 
proceedings, that he was shielded from liability because D & K was transporting his 
kitchen chair to his condominium and not him personally. Given the late assertion of this 
defense at trial, Plaintiff moved either strike this defense or to amend her complaint to 
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add D & K as a party. 
In response thereto the Trial Court found that adding D & K would have violated 
its rights under both the US and State Constitutions and would be prejudicial. TR 985-
986. During oral argument the trial judge also erroneously stated: "You might reach Dan 
if you had sued D & K Inc. And you pierced the corporate veil. But you've got to have 
both steps." TT 9:11-12. As was argued above and as shown below, this is not the law. 
As set forth above in Penrose and Nunez, if Dan was acting on behalf of D & K in 
moving his kitchen chair, then his relationship at the time was identical to that of D & K. 
Therefore, there was "an identity of interest existing] between" him and D & K, 
"permitting an amendment to the complaint adding the [employer] as a party to the 
complaint." This is true because, despite the fact that Dan and D & K may point fingers 
at each other (which does not preclude the existence of an identity of interest), they, in 
fact, have an "identity of interest exist[ing] between" them just as "the Hospital" in Nunez 
had "an identity of interest with the physician because the cause of action 'arose out of 
the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth... in the original pleading.'" This is 
true because, as in Nunez, the "court [should] also [note] that [D & K has] potential 
vicarious liability as the employer of [Dan]." Moreover, this is true and consistent with 
Nunez, because, "the [insurance company will most likely provide] legal counsel for [D & 
K], asserting that [Dan] was acting within the scope of his employment [with D & K] and 
[is] entitled to the [same defenses that neither was liable because as asserted by Dan, it is 
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the other Defendants who failed to come to a complete stop behind Ms. Jen Ottens' car 
that caused the accident and it was Jake, an independent contractor that failed to secure 
the kitchen chair]." Hence, as in Nunez, "any disposition of the case against the [Dan] 
would necessarily affect the [D & K's] liability. Thus, an identity of interest [exists] 
because the legal position and defenses of the two parties [are] the same," even though 
they may have other defenses to allow them to blame each other. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT EXCLUDED 
FROM EVIDENCE THE FACT THAT DAN HAD BEEN ISSUED A CITATION 
IN THE CASE FOR FAILURE TO SECURE HIS LOAD AND PLED GUILTY 
AND PAID THE CITATION 
As set forth above, the evidence suggests that, despite his denial, Dan was the 
driver of the truck from which the chair flew. As further proof of this fact, Dan was cited 
for "Failure to Secure his Load" and pled guilty and paid a fine thereon. TR 559-560, 
780 (Dan Depo. 27-28). This evidence tends to prove that Dan drove the vehicle. 
Although evidence regarding the issuance of a traffic citation is generally not admissible, 
under the circumstances of this case, this evidence should be admitted as an admission 
against interest to show that Dan drove the truck. 
The trial court is granted broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence, and its 
decision thereon will only be disturbed if there is an abuse of discretion. State v. Whittle, 
1999 UT 96,1f 20, 989 P.2d 52. Thus, a trial court's ruling on evidence will not be 
reversed unless the ruling "was beyond the limits of reasonability." Jensen v. IHC Hosps., 
Inc., 2003 UT 51, If 57, 82 P.3d 1076 (quoting State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239-40 
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(Utah 1992)). 
While the late UCA ffif 41-6-40,41-6-170 indicated that traffic citations cannot be 
used to attack credibility, they do not prohibit the admission thereof for other purposes 
like establishing ownership and control. "Under rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, 
the trial court should only exclude relevant evidence if its 'probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury/" State v. Vargas, 2001 UT 5, f 51, 20 P.3d 271 (quoting State v. DeCorso, 1999 UT 
57,1| 48, 993 P.2d 837). 
In this case, given Dan's obfuscation and given that Dan and Jake could have 
arguably manipulated the evidence, the its probative value of this evidence is not 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Therefore, in this case it was 
an abuse of discretion not to allow this. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT ALLOWED 
INTO EVIDENCE INFORMATION REGARDING WHEN PLAINTIFF HIRED 
AN ATTORNEY 
Dan argued that since Plaintiff allegedly retained an attorney "very quickly" after 
the accident that this fact somehow proves that her medical care and treatment, and her 
claim of disability are excessive and grossly exaggerated. This argument would require a 
juror to base such an inference upon supposition and prejudice against individuals that 
hire attorneys. Dan's argument thereon suggests that Plaintiff retained an attorney not to 
protect her legal rights, but to plot with her attorney regarding how to run the bill up and 
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dishonestly fabricate a case against Dan. Aside from the fact that this did not happen, this 
inference is offensive. Just as the Defendant had a right to an attorney at the very onset of 
any potential litigation, so did Plaintiff. 
When, where and how a plaintiff hires an attorney is irrelevant to the underlying 
issues. To rule otherwise would put a plaintiff in a damned-if-you-do-damned if-you-
don't situation. Pursuant to URE 401, "Relevant evidence" means evidence having any 
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of 
the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Here, 
the fact of whether or not Plaintiff had an attorney was not relevant to any factual dispute 
and Dan's counsel should not have been allowed to question Plaintiff about it. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully requested that this matter be remanded for trial with the direction 
to the Trial Court to add Jake McNeil and D & K as parties, and to allow the issue of Dan 
McNeil's liability to be submitted to a jury. It is further requested that the Court allow 
admission into evidence to the jury the fact that Dan was issued a citation for failure to 
secure his load, to which he pled guilty and paid a fine, and disallow Dan to question the 
Plaintiff about retaining her counsel. 
DATED: i7f5f, ^00? 
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DURRANT, Associate Chief Justice: 
INTRODUCTION 
fl In the spring of 2005, Celso Magana worked for an 
independent contractor that subcontracted with Dave Roth 
Construction ("DRC") to frame the walls for a planned restaurant. 
While Magana was working at the construction site, a load of 
trusses slipped from its rigging during the off-loading process 
and fell on Magana. As a result, Magana suffered spinal injuries 
and is now paraplegic. 
H2 Magana filed a negligence claim against DRC and ABM 
Crane Rental, asserting, in part, that DRC's superintendent, 
Brett Campbell, negligently rigged the bundle of trusses that 
fell on Magana. DRC later moved for summary judgment, claiming 
that Campbell did not actively participate in the off-loading of 
the trusses and, therefore, DRC was shielded from liability by 
the retained control doctrine. In response, Magana argued 
liability under two negligence theories: retained control and 
direct negligence. 
f3 The district court granted DRC's motion for summary 
judgment, dismissing Magana's negligence claim against DRC. The 
court of appeals affirmed the district court's decision. Both 
courts determined that even if Campbell directly participated in 
rigging the trusses, he did not actively participate in the 
rigging process in such a way as to retain sufficient control to 
expose DRC to liability for the negligent rigging of the trusses. 
Neither court addressed Magana's direct negligence argument 
outside the context of the retained control doctrine. 
14 We granted certiorari on the question of whether the 
court of appeals erred in its analysis of Magana's active 
participation argument. For the reasons discussed below, we hold 
that (1) the court of appeals correctly analyzed Magana's 
retained control argument, but (2) erred in failing to consider 
Magana's direct negligence argument outside the context of the 
retained control doctrine. Accordingly, we reverse the court of 
appeals' decision, and we remand this case to the district court 
to further consider Magana's direct negligence claim. 
BACKGROUND 
f5 Because we are reviewing a grant of summary judgment, 
we view "xthe facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom 
in the light most favorable'" to Magana, the nonmoving party.x 
Accordingly, we recount the facts in the light most favorable to 
Magana. 
16 The owner of a future restaurant hired DRC as the 
general contractor on the construction project. As general 
contractor, DRC was responsible for overseeing the construction 
of the building, purchasing building materials for the project, 
and securing necessary subcontractors. DRC hired Brett Campbell 
to superintend and manage the project. Among other duties, 
Campbell's job description included inspecting and ensuring 
quality control of the work completed by the subcontractors, 
including Circle T Construction ("Circle T"). 
1
 R&R Indus. Park, L.L.C. v. Utah Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. 
Ass'n, 2008 UT 80, % 18, 199 P.3d 917 (quoting Orvis v. Johnson, 
2008 UT 2, 1 6, 177 P.3d 600). 
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f7 DRC subcontracted with Circle T to provide "framing 
labor and crane work." Circle T conducted most of the framing 
work, and Campbell and DRC participated in related tasks. For 
example, Campbell worked with Circle T's owner, Ted Alexander, to 
determine where to place the walls, and Campbell snapped the 
lines marking their location. Further, DRC supplied the lumber 
and arranged for the shipping of the framing materials to the 
project site. In addition, Magana claims that DRC was 
responsible for determining where on the construction site the 
lumber should be placed. 
%8 On the day before the accident, Campbell notified 
Alexander that truss joists were arriving that day and that 
Circle T was responsible for off-loading the joists by crane. 
Alexander later learned that the crane company Circle T normally 
used was not available and notified Campbell. Campbell offered 
to help Alexander find another crane company, and both agreed to 
start calling crane companies. Campbell eventually found an 
available crane company and scheduled it to off-load the truss 
joists the following day. 
%9 The next morning, Campbell "got Ted Alexander and the 
truck driver [of the truck carrying the trusses] together to work 
out the exact place to unload the trusses." The crane showed up 
later that morning, and Alexander directed the crane's operator 
where to set up the crane and where to off-load the trusses. 
After the crane was set up, Alexander and Campbell began off-
loading the trusses. Before lifting the first load of trusses 
from the truck bed, the bundles were rigged to a hoist. The 
crane off-loaded the first bundle without any help or direction 
from Campbell, after which Circle T employees removed the rigging 
straps and returned them to Alexander. 
flO Magana testified that after the first bundle of trusses 
was off-loaded, he saw Campbell on the bed of the flatbed truck 
with Alexander, and both were placing straps around the second 
bundle of trusses. 
Ull While this second bundle was being carried to the off-
loading site, the bundle became unbalanced and fell on Magana. 
As a result, Magana suffered spinal injuries and is now 
paraplegic. When the load fell on Magana, Campbell was on the 
truck bed helping Alexander unload boxes of blocking. 
fl2 The off-loading process was solely Circle T's 
responsibility. Campbell and Alexander both testified that even 
if Campbell had helped in rigging the trusses, he did not retain 
any control over the process or direct, instruct, or control the 
manner in which the truss joists were rigged or off-loaded. Both 
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also testified that if Campbell had assisted Alexander to rig the 
trusses, Alexander would have retained complete control over 
Campbell's rigging work. 
113 ABM Crane Rental did not bill either DRC or Circle T 
for its work on the date of the accident. But the owner of the 
crane company stated that he would have billed DRC for the work, 
not Circle T. 
1(14 Following the accident, Magana filed a complaint 
alleging that ABM Crane Rental's and DRC's negligence caused 
Magana7s injuries. Magana subsequently settled with ABM Crane 
Rental. DRC moved for summary judgment. In support of the 
motion, DRC argued that Circle T, not Campbell, controlled the 
manner in which the trusses were rigged and off-loaded and, 
therefore, DRC was not liable for Campbell's negligence, even if 
Campbell were the one who negligently rigged the trusses. 
fl5 In response, Magana asserted two negligence theories. 
First, Magana made a direct negligence argument. Specifically, 
Magana claimed that Campbell directly helped rig the second load 
of truss joists and that there was an issue of fact as to whether 
Campbell was the one who "failed to safely rig the second load of 
truss joists." Magana also made this argument before the court 
of appeals and does so before us as well. 
fl6 Second, Magana argued that because Campbell (l) was 
responsible for on-site safety, (2) determined where to place the 
walls and snapped a line marking their location, (3) hired the 
crane company, (4) directed the crane where to set up and off-
load the trusses, and (5) directly participated in rigging the 
second load, DRC actively participated in Circle T's work and was 
liable for Magana's injuries under the retained control doctrine. 
fl7 The district court granted DRC's motion and determined 
that the central issue in the matter was whether DRC, through 
Campbell, actively participated in the off-loading process. The 
court found that DRC did not actively participate, and, based on 
that finding, the court granted the summary judgment motion. 
Magana appealed the decision to the Utah Court of Appeals, which 
likewise held that Magana failed to show that Campbell exercised 
sufficient control over Alexander or Circle T to meet the active 
participation standard.2 
fl8 Magana subsequently filed a petition for certiorari 
review, which we granted. Pursuant to our jurisdiction under 
2
 Maaana v. Dave Roth Constr., 2008 UT App 240U. 
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Utah Code section 78A-3-102(3)(a) (2008), we now review the court 
of appeals' decision and determine whether the court of appeals 
correctly applied the active participation standard to Magana's 
claims. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
i[l9 On certiorari, we review the court of appeals' decision 
for correctness.3 
ANALYSIS 
12 0 We hold that the court of appeals' analysis of the 
active participation standard, as it relates to DRC's argument 
that it did not retain control, was correct. But the active 
participation standard does not apply to Magana's direct 
negligence argument. Because a question of fact remains 
regarding Campbell's direct negligence in causing Magana's 
injuries, the court of appeals erred in affirming the district 
court's dismissal of Magana's negligence claim against DRC. 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY APPLIED THE ACTIVE 
PARTICIPATION STANDARD 
U21 Magana contends that DRC, through its agent Campbell, 
is liable for the negligence that caused Magana's injuries 
because Campbell "actively participated" in the construction 
project. We disagree. Active participation is a term of art 
that describes the level of control necessary to find an employer 
liable for its contractor's actions. In this case, DRC and its 
agent Campbell are the employer while Circle T and its agent 
Alexander are the contractor as those terms are used in applying 
the active participation standard.4 
3
 Massev v. Griffiths, 2007 UT 10, % 8, 152 P.3d 312. 
4
 For purposes of the general non-liability rule, the terms 
"employer" and "independent contractor" are used generally. For 
example, the term "employer" could mean an owner who hires a 
contractor to oversee the construction of a building, in which 
case the contractor would be considered the "independent 
contractor." The term "employer" could also mean a contractor 
who hires a subcontractor to complete a specific part of the 
construction, in which case the subcontractor would be the 
"independent contractor." In the current case, the employer is 
DRC and the contractor is Circle T. 
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f22 "Utah adheres to the general common law rule that 'the 
employer of an independent contractor is not liable for physical 
harm caused to another by an act or omission of the contractor or 
his servants."'5 "This general rule recognizes that one who 
hires an independent contractor and does not participate in or 
control the manner in which the contractor's work is performed 
owes no duty of care concerning the safety of the manner or 
method of performance implemented."6 By the rule's plain 
language, the scope of the rule is limited to circumstances in 
which the direct act or omission of the contractor, not the 
employer, causes an injury. 
123 Despite the general non-liability rule, the employer of 
a contractor remains liable for the contractor's actions when the 
employer "'participate [s] in or control[s] the manner in which 
the contractor's work is performed,' and therefore 'owes [a] duty 
of care concerning the safety of the manner or method of 
performance implemented.'"7 This exception to the general non-
liability rule is called the retained control doctrine, and it is 
applied narrowly in "'unique circumstanceTsl where an employer of 
an independent contractor exercises enough control over the 
contracted work to give rise to a limited duty of care.'"8 
f24 In determining whether an employer exercised sufficient 
control to create liability under the retained control doctrine, 
we apply the active participation standard.9 Under that 
standard, an employer has a duty to ensure the safety of its 
contractor's work where the employer "actively participates" in 
the contractor's work.10 An employer actively participates if 
the employer "'directs that the contracted work be done by use of 
a certain mode or otherwise interferes with the means and methods 
5
 Thompson v. Jess, 1999 UT 22, % 13, 979 P.2d 322 (quoting 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 409 (1965)). 
6
 Id^ 
7
 Beqave v. Big D Constr. Corp., 2008 UT 4, 1 8, 178 P.3d 
343 (alterations in original) (quoting Thompson, 1999 UT 22, 1 
13) . 
8
 IdL 1 8 (quoting Thompson, 1999 UT 22, % 15). 
9
 IdL. 11 8-9. 
10
 Thompson, 1999 UT 22, 1 19. 
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by which the work is to be accomplished.'"11 In contrast, an 
employer does not actively participate in an activity when the 
employer merely exercises nxa general right to order the work 
stopped or resumed, to inspect its progress or to receive 
reports, to make suggestions or recommendations which need not 
necessarily be followed, or to prescribe alterations and 
deviations. ' "12 
i|2 5 Accordingly, the retained control doctrine and the 
accompanying active participation standard establish a two-step 
analysis. The first step is to determine whether the employer 
actively participated in the contractor's work and, therefore, 
had a limited duty of care to ensure that the work was conducted 
safely. When an employer actively participates, the next step is 
to determine whether the employer breached that duty of care. 
126 Magana asserts that DRC is liable for Magana's injuries 
because Campbell actively participated by: (1) snapping the 
lines for the walls and determining where to place them; (2) 
deciding with Circle T where to off-load the lumber shipped to 
the site; (3) hiring the crane company that assisted in the off-
loading; (4) bearing responsibility for on-site safety; and (5) 
directly participating in rigging the load of truss joists that 
fell on Magana. The first three facts that Magana relies upon 
fail to meet the active participation standard because they 
exceed the scope of the injury-causing activity. The fourth fact 
fails to meet the standard because a duty over general on-site 
safety cannot establish active participation. Finally, the fifth 
fact fails to meet the standard because it does not demonstrate 
that Magana retained control over the means and methods of 
rigging the trusses. 
A. Scope of the Injury-Causing Activity 
%21 Under the retained control doctrine, an employer is 
liable for the actions of an independent contractor when the 
employer exerts sufficient control over the independent 
contractor "such that [the contractor cannot] 'carry out the 
injury-causing aspect of the work' in its own way."13 An aspect 
11
 Begave, 2008 UT 4, f 9 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 
Thompson, 1999 UT 22, 1 19). 
12
 Thompson, 1999 UT 22, f 20 (quoting Restatement (Second) 
of Torts § 414 cmt. c (1965)). 
13
 Begaye, 2008 UT 4, f 11 (emphasis added) (quoting 
(continued...) 
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of the work constitutes an injury-causing aspect when the aspect 
is a legal cause of the plaintiff's injuries. An event is the 
legal or proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury when the event 
VXAin natural and continuous sequence, (unbroken by an efficient 
intervening cause), produces the injury and without which the 
result would not have occurred. It is the efficient cause--the 
one that necessarily sets in operation the factors that 
accomplish the injury.'"14 
f28 Magana was injured when a load of trusses slipped from 
their straps and fell from the crane that was carrying them, 
landing on Magana. The rigging process involved strapping the 
load of trusses to the crane. Neither Campbell's snapping the 
lines for the walls and determining where to place them, his 
deciding with Circle T where to off-load the lumber shipped to 
the site, nor his hiring the crane company that assisted in the 
off-loading was the legal cause of Magana's injuries. Each of 
the above listed activities occurred prior to the rigging of the 
load of trusses, which rigging constituted an efficient 
intervening cause of Magana's injuries. Further, Magana fails to 
offer any explanation or theory as to how any of the above stated 
actions relate to off-loading the trusses. Accordingly, each 
falls outside the scope of the injury-causing aspect of Circle 
T's work and, therefore, fails to show that DRC, through 
Campbell, actively participated in the process. 
B. General Responsibility for On-Site Safety 
f29 Only Campbell's general responsibility for on-site 
safety spanned the period during and after the load was rigged. 
Yet we have held that a general obligation to oversee safety on a 
project "does not equate to everting control over the method and 
manner of the injury-causing aspect of [the sub-contractor's] 
work."15 The same is true even where the general contractor has 
13
 (. . .continued) 
Thompson, 1999 UT 22, 1 21). 
14
 Mitchell v. Pearson Enters., 697 P.2d 240, 245-46 (Utah 
1985) (quoting State v. Lawson, 688 P.2d 479, 482 n.3 (Utah 
1984)) . 
15
 Begave, 2008 UT 4, 1 5 n.2; see also Thompson, 1999 UT 
22, 1 24 (refusing to find an employer liable for the acts of an 
independent contractor where the extent of the employer's control 
"amounted merely to control over the desired result" of a 
project). 
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closely monitored on-site safety.16 In support of this rule, we 
have noted that xx [p] enalizing a general contractor's efforts to 
promote safety and coordinate a general safety program among 
various independent contractors at a large jobsite hardly serves 
to advance the goal of work site safety."17 Therefore, 
Campbell's general responsibility for on-site safety does not 
amount to actively participating in an injury-causing aspect of 
the work. 
C. Retaining Control of the Means and Methods of the Work 
113 0 Finally, Magana asserts that DRC is liable for Magana's 
injuries under the retained control doctrine because Campbell 
actively participated by assisting Alexander in rigging the load 
of truss joists that fell on Magana. We disagree. 
131 Under the retained control doctrine, the employer must 
"'direct [] that the contracted work be done by use of a certain 
mode or otherwise interfere [] with the means and methods by which 
the work is to be accomplished.'"18 In other words, this 
standard requires that an employer "exert such control over the 
means utilized that the contractor cannot carry out the injury-
causing aspect of the work in his or her own way."19 Thus, the 
question of whether an employer actively participated is not 
simply whether an employer participated in an injury-causing 
activity, but whether the employer controlled the means and 
methods by which the injury-causing activity was performed.20 
f32 As we noted in an earlier decision, the Arizona Supreme 
Court's decision in Lewis v. N.J. Riebe Enterprises, Inc.21 
illustrates the degree of control necessary to meet the active 
16
 Beaave. 2008 UT 4, 1 11 n.4. 
17
 Id. (quoting Martens v. MCL Constr. Corp., 807 N.E.2d 
480, 490 (111. App. Ct. 2004)). 
18
 Id. H 9 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Thompson, 1999 UT 22, 
1 19). 
19
 Thompson, 1999 UT 22, % 21. 
20
 IcL 1 20 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 414 
cmt. c (1965)). 
21
 825 P.2d 5, 7-8 (Ariz. 1992). 
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participation standard.22 In Lewis, a general contractor ordered 
a subcontractor to reinstall a roof using a different method than 
that generally used by the subcontractor.23 The contractor's 
method was faster but less safe than that normally used by the 
subcontractor.24 Employing the new method resulted in numerous 
sheets of plywood lying unfastened on top of the roof's beams.25 
One of the subcontractor's employees later stepped on one of the 
loose sheets and fell through the roof.26 The Arizona Supreme 
Court held that, under these facts, the contractor interfered 
with the subcontractor's normal method of performing the work 
and, therefore, was subject to retained control liability.27 We 
agreed and held that this was the degree of control necessary to 
meet our active participation standard.28 
f33 Applying this standard to the case at hand, we affirm 
the court of appeals' conclusion that Campbell did not actively 
participate in rigging the load of trusses. 
134 The undisputed evidence shows that Circle T, through 
its agent Alexander, controlled the off-loading process. 
Alexander decided where to place the truss joists and was solely 
responsible for the method and means used to off-load the 
trusses. Both Campbell and Alexander testified that, even if 
Campbell helped rig the second load, he did not direct, instruct, 
or control the manner in which Circle T conducted the operation. 
Magana did not contest their testimony. Rather, he suggests that 
by participating in rigging the second load, Campbell actively 
participated in off-loading the trusses. However, participation 
alone is not sufficient to show active participation for purposes 
of the retained control doctrine. Because Magana failed to offer 
any testimony or other evidence supporting a claim that Campbell 
directed or controlled the manner in which Circle T off-loaded 
the trusses, his argument fails. 
22
 Thompson, 1999 UT 22, 1 22. 
23
 IcL_ (citing Lewis, 825 P.2d at 7-8) . 
24
 Id. 
25
 Id. 
26
 Id^ (citing Lewis, 825 P.2d at 7-8) . 
27
 Id^ 1 23 (citing Lewis, 825 P.2d at 14-15) . 
28
 See id^ 11 22, 24. 
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135 In sum, the court of appeals correctly held that DRC, 
through Campbell, did not actively participate for purposes of 
the retained control doctrine in off-loading the trusses when he 
determined where to place the walls, snapped the lines to mark 
the location of the walls, hired the crane company, decided with 
Circle T where to place the trusses, bore responsibility for on-
site safety, or helped Alexander rig the second load of trusses. 
Each of these activities either exceeds the scope of the injury-
causing activity or fails to show that DRC exercised sufficient 
control over Circle T's work. Accordingly, DRC did not owe 
Magana a duty to ensure that Circle T conducted the off-loading 
process safely and is not liable under the retained control 
doctrine for Magana7s injuries. 
II. THE RETAINED CONTROL DOCTRINE DOES NOT IMMUNIZE A CONTRACTOR 
FROM ITS OWN NEGLIGENT ACTS 
1[36 We now turn to Magana's direct negligence theory. 
Although the court of appeals correctly held that Campbell's 
assistance in rigging the second load of trusses did not 
constitute retaining control of the subcontractor's actions, the 
court erred in affirming the dismissal of Magana's negligence 
claim. The court made this error because it only considered 
Magana's negligence claim under the retained control doctrine. 
The court failed to separately consider Magana's claim under the 
direct negligence theory that Magana also advanced. 
1(3 7 The retained control doctrine is separate and distinct 
from a direct negligence theory. Specifically, the retained 
control doctrine does not apply when a plaintiff alleges that an 
employer's own actions were negligent. Rather, the doctrine is 
limited to circumstances where the plaintiff alleges that the 
employer of a contractor is liable for the contractor's 
negligence because the employer retained sufficient control over 
the contractor's actions to owe the plaintiff a duty of care 
regarding the contractor's actions.29 Likewise, the common law 
general non-liability rule only recognizes that employers are not 
29
 Begave v. Big D Constr. Corp.. 2008 UT 4, H 8, 178 P.3d 
343. 
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liable for the actions of their contractors.30 The rule does not 
speak to an employer's liability for its own actions.31 
13 8 Once an employer goes beyond mere direction or control 
of the contractor's work and directly acts in such a way that 
causes an injury, the employer may be liable for its own direct 
negligence. It is not a defense that the employer was conducting 
the work of the independent contractor when the employer caused 
the injury. Simply because an employer submits to the means and 
methods chosen by the contractor does not change the fact that 
the employer remains the contractor's employer. If while 
assisting the contractor the employer were to decide to change 
the means and methods of the work, the employer would be at 
liberty to do so.32 Accordingly, we conclude that an employer 
remains liable for its own direct actions, even if the employer 
is assisting its contractor and acting according to the means and 
methods that the contractor has prescribed. 
f39 Magana testified that he observed Campbell and 
Alexander both rigging the load of trusses that subsequently 
slipped and fell on Magana.33 DRC accepts this fact as true for 
30
 Thompson v. Jess, 1999 UT 22, 1 13, 979 P.2d 322 
("x[T]he employer of an independent contractor is not liable for 
physical harm caused to another by an act or omission of the 
contractor or his servants.'" (emphasis added) (quoting 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 409 (1965))). 
31
 See W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law 
of Torts 510 (1984) ("Quite apart from any question of vicarious 
responsibility, the employer may be liable for any negligence of 
his own in connection with the work to be done.") . 
32
 See, e.g., Thompson, 1999 UT 22, 11 22-23. 
33
 DRC contends that Magana's testimony regarding Campbell 
rigging the trusses is inconsistent and should, therefore, be 
disregarded. We disagree. 
In Webster v. Sill, we explained that "when a party takes a 
clear position in a deposition, that is not modified on cross-
examination, he may not thereafter raise an issue of fact by his 
own affidavit which contradicts his deposition, unless he can 
provide an explanation of the discrepancy." 675 P.2d 1170, 1172-
73 (Utah 1983). 
Magana's deposition testimony was unclear and his subsequent 
affidavit provided a sufficient explanation of the discrepancy. 
In his deposition, Magana first testified that he saw someone 
(continued...) 
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purposes of its summary judgment motion. Whether Campbell indeed 
assisted in the rigging of the load of trusses that slipped and 
fell on Magana is a question of fact regarding Campbell's direct 
negligence. Accordingly, the court of appeals erred in affirming 
the district court's grant of summary judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
f40 The court of appeals correctly held that DRC, through 
its agent Campbell, did not retain control of the off-loading of 
the truss joists by determining where to place the walls of the 
restaurant, deciding with Circle T where to off-load the lumber 
on-site, hiring the crane company that assisted in the off-
loading, bearing responsibility for on-site safety, and directly 
participating in rigging the second load of truss joists. In 
each instance, Magana's claims either exceeded the scope of the 
injury-causing aspect of Circle T's work or failed to meet the 
active participation standard. But the active participation 
standard does not apply to Magana's direct negligence theory. By 
asserting that Campbell himself negligently rigged the truss 
joists, Magana's negligence claim exceeds the scope of the 
retained control doctrine because the assertion relates to 
Campbell's acts, and not the acts of Circle T. Further, Magana's 
testimony that he witnessed Campbell rig the second load is 
sufficient to create a factual issue as to direct negligence. 
Therefore, we reverse the court of appeals' decision and remand 
this case to the district court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
141 Chief Justice Durham, Justice Wilkins, Justice Parrish, 
and Justice Nehring concur in Associate Chief Justice Durrant's 
opinion. 
(...continued) 
helping Alexander rig the second load, and then changed his 
testimony by stating he was not sure whether he saw someone 
helping. This inconsistency within the testimony itself suggests 
that his position was unclear. During cross-examination, Magana 
modified his statement by stating that someone did help Alexander 
rig the second load. In a subsequent affidavit, Magana explained 
that in regard to his answer that he was not sure whether he saw 
someone help rig the load, there was either a mis-translation or 
he had misunderstood the question. Under Webster this is a 
sufficient explanation of the discrepancy such that we decline to 
disregard Magana's testimony. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JENNIFER OTTENS, 
Plaintiff, 
NICKOLAS COLEMAN, an individual 
and DAN MCNEIL, an individual 
Defendants. 
) JUDGMENT ON DIRECTED 
) VERDICT 
) 
) 
) Civil No. 050911123 
) 
) Judge Robert K. Hilder 
) 
) 
The above matter came on regularly for trial on December 15,2008. Plaintiff was 
present personally and represented by her attorney, Loren Lambert. Defendant was 
present personally and represented by his counsel, Richard K. Glauser. 
Voir Dire was conducted by the court and by both counsel. A jury was duly 
empaneled. Both parties presented opening statements. Plaintiff called witnesses and 
elicited testimony and presented exhibits. 
The trial continued on Tuesday, December 16, 2008 and Wednesday, December 
17, 2008. Both parties presented evidence by elicited testimony and documents. On 
December 17, 2008, the parties stipulated that all evidence regarding liability had been 
presented and that the court could proceed to hear post trial motions with regard to liability 
issues. 
Post trial motions were heard on Thursday, December 18,2008. The court, having 
heard argument of counsel and having carefully considered all of the evidence in this case 
pertaining to issues of liability and being fully advised in the premises; 
NOW, orders as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs oral motion to admit into evidence a statement authored by 
unknown individuals but alleged by plaintiff to be partially by Dan McNeil is 
denied. The court already ruled on this matter and allowed counsel for 
plaintiff to freely question Dan McNeil regarding this statement and allow this 
evidence to go to the jury. The statement contains references to insurance 
which are contrary to this court's prior order in limine and is of unknown 
authorship and does not appear to be inherently reliable. 
2. Plaintiff made an oral motion to amend the pleadings to add D&K Finish 
Carpentry, Inc., as a party defendant. This motion was also denied. The 
court finds that the motion is not timely made, that granting the motion at this 
stage would result in tremendous prejudice to the defendant and to D&K 
Finish Carpentry, Inc. The court further finds that to add D&K Finish 
Carpentry, Inc. and to bind it to any results of this trial would violate the Fifth 
and Fourteenth/Wmendments to the United States Constitution and would 
result in a taking of property without due process of law. The court also finds 
adding D&K Finish Carpentry and binding it to any judgment at this hour 
would violate Article I Section 7 of the constitution of the State of Utah as 
depriving D&K Finish Carpentry, Inc. of property without due process of law. 
The court also finds that there is no unity of interest between Dan McNeil and 
D&K Finish Carpentry, Inc. In fact, Dan McNeil's defense that Jake McNeil 
was acting as an employee of D&K Finish Carpentry, Inc. rather than his 
employee and other matters evidence a conflict in the legally helpful 
positions of the two. The court finds that the liability of D&K Finish 
Carpentry, Inc., was never explored, litigated or set forth in this matter and 
that there is no basis to amend the pleadings at this stage regarding D&K 
Finish Carpentry, Inc. 
3. The court, having carefully considered Dan McNeil's motion for a directed 
verdict, hereby grants the same. The court finds that there is no evidence 
upon which ^ rreasonablejwy could conclude that Jake McNeil was acting as 
an employee of or in the course and scope of employment with Dan McNeil 
personally. The court finds there is no basis from which vicarious liability 
would lie on the part of Dan McNeil for the actions of Jake McNeil. 
4. The court further finds that there is no credible evidence upon which a jury 
could conclude that Dan McNeil breached a duty owed to plaintiff to secure 
the load in the truck owned by and driven by Jake McNeil. 
THEREFORE, a directed verdict and judgment is hereby rendered in favor of Dan 
McNeil and against plaintiff, Jennifer Ottens. Dan McNeil is awarded costs a3 the 
icected
 f > 
DATED this /£** day of <^£%LMLAMJ <£**?. 
BY THE CO 
Approved as to form: 
LOREN LAMBERT 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JENNIFER OTTENS, ) ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
) AMEND HER COMPLAINT 
Plaintiff, ) 
v. ) 
) Civil No. 050911123 
NICKOLAS COLEMAN, an individual and ) 
DAN MCNEIL, an individual ) Judge J Dennis Frederick 
Defendants. 
Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Complaint, with the accompanying memorandum of points 
and authorities, came before this Court. After reviewing the motion and the supporting and 
opposing memoranda, and for good cause shown, the Court hereby ORDERS, ADJUDGES 
AND DECREES: 
The Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint is hereby denied, because it would be 
legally futile, as the relevant statute of limitation for bringing the action ran before the motion 
to amend was filed. The record shows that Plaintiff knew of its claim against Jake McNeil 
before the limitations period expired, but did not move to amend its complaint for almost six 
FILES BISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
N O V - 9 2006 
SALT LAKf COUNTY 
Deptrtypefk 
(6) months thereafter. The amended complaint would not relate back to the time of the filing 
of the original complaint because there is no identity of legal interest between Jake McNeil 
and his father Dan McNeil, underthe test enunciated by the Utah Court of Appeals in Penrose 
v Ross. /ivK 
DATED this _ £ f f d a y of ©Gteberr 2006 
Approved as to Form 
Lor^ PKCambert 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
BY THE 
nnis Frederi 
Judge 
John Lund 
Attorney for Defendant Nicolas Coleman 
2 
Jake McNeil before the limitations period expired, but did not move to amend its 
complaint for almost six (6) months thereafter. The amended complaint would not relate 
back to the time of the filing of the original complaint because there is no identity of legal 
interest between Jake McNeil and his father Dan McNeil, under the test enunciated by 
the Utah Court of Appeals in Penrose v Ross. 
DATED this day of October, 2006. 
BY THE COURT 
The Honorable J. Dennis Frederick 
Third District Court Judge 
Approved as to Form 
Loren Lambert 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Jonn Lund 
Attorney for Defendant Nicolas Coleman 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE / / V / 
The undersigned does hereby certify that on t he j y ^day of (>(UJli-&t. 2006, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing was served on the following, by placing it in the 
U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid. 
Loren M. Lambert 
ARROW LEGAL SOLUTIONS GROUP, PC 
266 East 7200 South 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
John Lund 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JENNIFER OTTENS, 1 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
NICKOLAS COLEMAN and DAN 
MCNEIL, 
Defendants. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Case No. 050911123 
Hon. J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
October 6, 2 006 
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to 
Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint. Although oral argument 
v/as requested, such is not required by the applicable rules, nor 
is the Court persuaded a hearing would be of assistance in this 
matter. Accordingly, the ruling with respect to the motion will 
be addressed in the following Minute Entry. 
This case arises the result of an auto accident allegedly 
precipitated by a chair falling out of the back of a truck on 
1-15. 
With this motion, Plaintiff seeks to amend her Complaint to 
add Jake McNeil as a defendant. According to Plaintiff, she 
recently discovered that Jake McNeil, Defendant Dan McNeil's son, 
was the driver of the vehicle that was operating the truck from 
which the chair fell, setting into motion the chain of events 
that caused Plaintiff's injuries. According to Plaintiff, Jake 
was working for his father at the time of the accident. 
Defendants oppose the motion arguing amendment should not be 
allowed because it is legally futile, brought more than four (4) 
years from the date of the accident that gave rise to the 
underlying claims and, thus, barred by the relevant statute of 
limitations. Moreover, contend Defendants, the amendment would 
not relate back in time because there is no identity of interest 
between Jake and Dan McNeil. Indeed, assert Defendants, these 
individuals do not share the same "legal position." 
Finally, argue Defendants, Plaintiff knew of the basis for 
the claim against Jake before the statute of limitations ran and, 
yet, failed to move to amend the Complaint for almost six (6) 
months thereafter. 
After reviewing the record in this matter, the Court finds 
granting Plaintifffs Motion to Amend Complaint is not proper 
because it is legally futile, being brought more than four years 
from the date of the accident. Indeed, despite Plaintiff's 
claims to the contrary, under the reasoning of the Utah Court of 
Appeals in Penrose v. Ross, 71 P.3d 63 (Utah App. 2003), the 
Complaint is time barred under the relevant statute of limitation 
and the amendment would not relate back because the requisite 
identity of interest between Jake and Dan McNeil is lacking. 
Based upon the forgoing, Plaintiff's Motion to Amend 
Complaint is, respectfully, denied. 
A 
DATED t h i s / { 7 ^ a a y of O c t o b e r , 2006 . 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JENNIFER OTTENS, ] 
Plaintiff, 
v. ] 
NICKOLAS COLEMAN, an individual ] 
and DAN MCNEIL, an individual 
i ORDER ON PRETRIAL MOTIONS 
( Civil No. 050911123 
) Judge Robert Hilder 
Defendants. 
Various pretrial motions filed by both plaintiff and defendant came on regularly for 
hearing on December 12, 2008. The plaintiff was represented by counsel, Lauren 
Lambert. The defendant was represented by counsel, Richard K. Glauser. The court, 
having reviewed various memoranda and having heard arguments of counsel and being 
fulling advised in the premises; 
NOW ORDERS as follows: 
1. Defendant's Motion in Limine Regarding the Traffic Citation is granted. 
Plaintiff, plaintiffs counsel and plaintiffs witnesses are precluded from 
HLEBBSSTHSTSSUfiT 
Third Judicial District 
DEC 1 -n08 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Deputy Clerk 
mentioning that a citation was issued to Dan McNeil or the disposition of that 
citation. 
2. Defendant's Motion in Limine Regarding the Liability Insurance Coverage for 
the defendant is also granted. Plaintiff, plaintiffs counsel and plaintiff's 
witnesses are precluded from mentioning that defendant has insurance 
coverage available to him for this accident. 
3. Defendant's Motion to Exclude and Disclose Witnesses is uncontested and 
is granted. Plaintiff shall be limited to calling witnesses that were properly 
disclosed in pretrial disclosures. 
4. Defendant's Motion to Remove PIP Benefits from the Verdict, if any, was 
also unopposed and is granted. 
5. Defendant's Motion in Limine prohibiting plaintiff from mentioning that 
defendant never went back and picked up the chair is denied. However, 
plaintiffs counsel is instructed to confer with the court before mentioning to 
the jury that defendant failed to go retrieve his chair until the court has an 
opportunity to hear the evidence and make an informed decision on the 
matter. 
With regard to plaintiffs motions in limine, the court rules as follows: 
1. Plaintiff's Motion in Limine prohibiting evidence of apportionment of fault to 
Jiffy Lube is denied. The court will rule on whether Jiffy Lube can be 
included on a special jury verdict form after the court has heard the evidence. 
2 
2. Plaintiff's Motion in Limine to prohibit mentioning defendant's health 
insurance is not contested and is granted. 
3. Plaintiff's Motion in Limine to prohibit irrelevant medical records is denied at 
this time. However, counsel for plaintiff can address specific pages at a later 
time and the court will determine whether the documents are prejudicial or 
totally irrelevant as well as the burden on counsel for such redactions. 
4. Plaintiff's Motion in Limine regarding DOPL records is denied. 
5. Plaintiffs Motion in Limine regarding illegible documents is denied. 
6. Plaintiff's Motion in Limine regarding school records other than the school 
transcript is reserved for ruling at a later time. 
7. Plaintiff's Motion in Limine regarding articles of incorporation is denied. 
8. Plaintiff's Motion in Limine regarding plaintiffs settlement documents with 
Jen Ottens is granted. However, defense can point out that plaintiff made 
a claim and collected on the claim and settled the claim. 
9. Plaintiffs Motion in Limine regarding Social Security records is denied as to 
applications but granted as to the decision by the Social Security 
Administration. 
10. Plaintiffs Motion in Limine regarding when plaintiff retained an attorney for 
this accident is denied. 
11. Plaintiff's Motion in Limine regarding specific pleadings is reserved until the 
court hears evidence at the time of trial. 
3 
DATED this / f "day of December, 2008. 
BY THE GTOUfeT 
Tile bronorable Robert 
Third District Court Judge 
4 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
i hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was faxed 
and mailed, postage prepaid this /«£ th day of December, 2008, to the following: 
Loren M. Lambert 
ARROW LEGAL SOLUTIONS GROUP, PC 
266 East 7200 South 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
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